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 Executive Summary 
 
Despite the potential relevance of psychological factors in explaining price 
movements in the housing markets, no research has directly tested the relationship 
between sentiment and house prices. This thesis examines the role of sentiment in 
setting house prices, and thus their well-documented high volatility and susceptibility 
to bubbles. The two research questions guiding the empirical tests in this thesis are: 
(1) Does sentiment have a role in explaining house price movements, above and 
beyond the role of fundamentals, and (2) Do past price movements predict changes in 
sentiment beyond the predictions of lagged sentiment and fundamentals? On one 
hand, sentiment is expected to positively drive home prices through its effect on the 
demand side in the short run. On the other hand, myopic expectations suggest a 
reverse causality relation from price movements to sentiment. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, it introduces a set of direct 
proxies that appear to capture the consensus sentiment of three major agents in the 
housing markets, moving away from the “residual price” measures employed in prior 
research. Secondly, the use of explicit indicators allows for a dynamic model to 
directly estimate the timing, magnitude as well as direction of impact between 
sentiment and house prices. Such insights are not permissible in prior studies as they 
infer sentiment’s effect from house price residuals. 
To measure and isolate sentiment’s effect, this study employs direct indicators 
that capture the sentiment of three major agents in the U.S. housing markets: 
homebuyers (demand side), builders (supply side) and lenders (intermediaries). These 
sentiment measures are derived from surveys conducted on a frequent basis by the 
University of Michigan, the National Association of Home Builders, and the Federal 
Reserve Board, respectively. To measure house price appreciation, this study uses the 
percentage change in the real Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index.  
The dynamic relationship between housing market sentiment and housing 
prices is modeled in a VAR framework with two endogenous variables both expressed 
as linear functions of their own and each other’s lagged value. Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation is employed to simultaneously estimate the VAR system using quarterly 
data over the 1990:Q2 - 2010:Q3 sample period.  
 Empirical results show that the sentiment of all three market participants 
positively influences house price appreciations in subsequent quarters. Moreover, 
this sentiment effect is seen to be highly persistent and takes beyond five years to 
correct. The sentiment-induced component becomes much larger during episodes of 
fast escalating and slumping house prices (i.e., the formation and bursting of housing 
bubbles) than in more moderate periods. This thesis also finds evidence of myopic 
expectations among homebuyers and lenders; however, homebuilders do not appear 
to be backward-looking. The dynamic interplay between sentiment and home prices is 
therefore a self-reinforcing process, which potentially renders housing markets highly 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
1. Background and motivation 
 House prices tend to be quite volatile relative to observable swings in 
economic fundamentals (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008). In the latest U.S. housing 
turmoil, a rapid and consistent surge in home prices occurred from 1998 to 2006. 
Although the boom was fuelled in part by easy credit in its initial years, the later 
phase saw house prices reaching levels far above what economic fundamentals could 
reasonably support.  
Popular explanations in the housing economics literature for the remarkable 
house price run-up include cheap credit (Mayer and Sinai, 2009; Glaeser, Gottlieb 
and Gyourko, 2010), easy credit, and subprime lending (Mayer and Pence, 2009; Lai 
and Van Order, 2010)1
                                                          
1 Mayer and Sinai (2009), in particular, show that the growth in subprime lending was largest in 
housing markets with the biggest growth in price-rent ratios. Mayer and Pence (2009) further 
document that the median loan-to-value ratio of a housing loan was an astounding 100% for subprime 
mortgages originated in 2005, 2006 and the first half of 2007. 
. Other explanations for the rapid house price appreciation 
include supply restrictions (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008) and growth in the 
demand for second and investment homes (Wheaton and Nechavey, 2008). 
Regardless of the fundamental models employed, almost all the empirical research 
suggests that actual house prices are more volatile over the cycle than would be 
predicted by economic fundamentals. Acknowledging that it is hard to explain the 
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rapid rise and fall of housing prices across U.S. markets with a purely rational model, 
some researchers have suggested that non-rational explanations, such as exuberance 
and unrealistic expectations of future price appreciation, cannot be ruled out (see 
Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008; Mayer, 2011). Indeed, the very formation and 
subsequent bursting of such pricing bubbles has been suggested as the most direct 
evidence of prices being driven in part by misguided beliefs.2 In their recent study 
which concludes that easy credit cannot account for the majority of the price changes 
in the recent housing boom and bust3
To gauge the driving forces behind home purchase decisions during the recent 
housing boom, Case and Shiller (2003) conducted a survey of homebuyers in four 
U.S. metropolitan areas (MSAs). They put forward several questions to address the 
role of expectations, emotional charge and the extent of talk about real estate in 
homebuyers’ buying decisions. They conclude that a housing bubble was evident in 
2003, for demand was being largely driven by at least three sentiment indicators 
found from the survey. Firstly, on average respondents expected the price 
appreciation rate over the following decade to be about 12%-16% per year, a 
, Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2010) refer to 
the work of Case and Shiller (2003) as a compelling alternative explanation. 
                                                          
2 In fact, it is the very definition of a bubble – that is, a rapid price run-up not justified by 
economic fundamentals but by unrealistically high expectations of future prices (Stiglitz, 1990).   
 
3  Although interest rates do influence house prices, GGG (2010) conclude that cost of credit 
cannot provide anything close to a complete explanation of the great housing market gyrations between 
1996 and 2010. Indeed over the long 1996-2006 boom, they observe that falling interest rates only 
explain about 20% of the rise in house prices. Neither can the approval rates or down payment 
requirements account for most of the movement in house prices. 
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strikingly high range4
 Clearly, it appears from the above work that investor psychology may lead to 
very large and persistent mispricing in housing markets. When prices start to rise, 
irrational exuberance may lead buyers and sellers to become carried away by 
irrational expectations of future price appreciation, causing house prices to spike in 
booms. As a result, house prices become excessively volatile over the cycle, rising 
more than fundamentals would suggest in a boom and falling faster than the decline 
in fundamentals in a bust. Such behavioural biases have long been a popular 
explanation for various asset-pricing puzzles which are hard to reconcile with a 
rational framework. The focus, however, has been mainly on the pricing of 
securitized assets in the finance realm
. Secondly, at least two thirds of respondents agreed that it was 
a good time to buy a home because prices might rise further and erode their 
affordability. Finally, about 30%-46% of the respondents admitted they were being 
influenced by the “excitement” around them. More recently, Piazzesi & Schneider 
(2009) use the Michigan Survey of Consumers to find that there was always a small 
cluster of “momentum” agents who believed prices would continue to rise further. 
What was unusual about the boom, as noted in their paper, is the increased proportion 
of these optimists in the market, which peaked precisely at the time when prices rose 
to their historical high in 2004-2005. 
5
                                                          
4 Even an appreciation rate of only 12% per year means a tripling of value in ten years (Case 
and Shiller, 2003). 
. Much as the inherent characteristics of 
 
5  The possible effect of investor sentiment on asset prices is a long running debate in the 
financial economics literature. In classical finance models of asset pricing, there is no role for investor 
sentiment due to the rational actions of informed arbitrageurs. However, in behavioral finance models, 
investor sentiments can play a role in the determination of asset prices – independent of market 
fundamentals. Brown and Cliff (2005) note that respected researchers have entered on both sides of the 
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housing markets imply that home prices are highly prone to sentiment, there is not yet 
any empirical research aimed at understanding their dynamic relationship thus far. In 
the housing markets, high transaction costs and limits on short-selling discourage 
informed traders from taking advantage of profit opportunities in the market to 
eliminate mispricing. Consequently, housing prices can diverge from fundamentals 
over a prolonged period, consistent with the argument that housing markets are less 
efficient than financial markets (Case and Shiller, 1989). Price corrections may also 
span much longer horizons because sentiment appears to be persistent and reinforced 
by the positive feedback from home price movements. These characteristics 
inevitably call for more work on the role that sentiment plays in housing price 
dynamics.  
 
2. Research focus and contribution 
 Despite the potential relevance of psychological factors in explaining price 
movements in the housing market, no research has directly tested the relationship 
between sentiment and house prices due to the difficulty in measuring sentiment. 
Archer and Smith (2011), in particular, note that “euphoria” cannot be measured 
directly because it is largely psychological in nature. Therefore, sentiment is often 
inferred indirectly through price deviations from fundamental values, which are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
argument as to whether the stock price run-up and subsequent market collapse of 1929 (as well as the 
rapid rise and fall of technology stocks) was rational or not. Clayton, Ling and Naranjo, (2009) 
postulate that the behavioral approach explicitly recognizes that some investors are not rational and 
that systematic biases in these investor’s belief induce them to trade on non-fundamental information 
(i.e. sentiment). 
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usually determined based on real construction cost, income multiples, or present 
value of rents (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Clayton, 1996, 1997; Lai & Van 
Order, 2010; Wheaton & Nechayev, 2008). For instance, Abraham and Hendershott 
(1996) use the deviation between the actual metropolitan house price level and a 
“fundamental” price level to explain the large cyclical swings in real house prices.6
 To bridge this gap in the literature, this thesis seeks to carry out a direct test 
on the dynamic relationship between prices and sentiment in the housing markets. 
The first contribution of this study is the introduction of a set of proxies that appear to 
capture the consensus sentiment of three major agents in the U.S. housing markets: 
homebuyers (demand side), builders (supply side) and residential mortgage lenders 
(intermediaries). These sentiment measures are derived from surveys conducted on a 
frequent basis by the University of Michigan, the National Association of Home 
Builders, and the Federal Reserve Board, respectively. Thus, this study moves away 
 
Clayton (1996) also concludes that economic fundamentals can largely explain price 
movements, but this ability deteriorates in times of large swings in house prices. This 
suggests his model “misses something in times of rapidly rising or falling prices,” 
which indirectly points to the role of psychology (Clayton, 1996). However, the main 
limitation of attributing a portion of the perceived mispricing to sentiment is the 
absence of precise valuation models. This makes it difficult to attribute the deviations 
to actual mispricing or model misspecification. 
                                                          
6 Similarly most authors attempt to determine whether a bubble exists by comparing actual 
house prices with what house prices should be based on a model of fundamentals. In doing so, 
researchers sometimes attribute large increases in actual house prices relative to fundamental house 
prices as representing periods in which a bubble exists. The presumption is that when house prices do 
not fully reflect fundamentals, a bubble is present (Mayer, 2011). 
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from the “residual price” measure often employed in prior research – that is, the 
difference between actual house prices and estimated “fundamental” prices. The use 
of explicit indicators allows for a dynamic model to directly estimate the timing, 
magnitude as well as direction of impact between sentiment and house prices, which 
constitutes the second contribution of this study. Such insights are not permissible in 
prior studies as they infer sentiment’s effect from house price residuals. 
 The two research questions guiding the empirical tests in this thesis are: (1) 
Does sentiment have a role in explaining house price movements, above and beyond 
the role of fundamentals, and (2) Do past price movements predict changes in 
sentiment beyond the predictions of lagged sentiment and fundamentals? On one 
hand, sentiment is expected to positively drive home prices through its effect on the 
demand side in the short run. On the other hand, myopic expectations suggest a 
reverse causality from prices to sentiment. When prices are increasing (decreasing), 
market participants (mistakenly) believe that prices will continue to increase 
(decrease) in the near future, suggesting that sentiment also follows price movements. 
The dynamic interaction between sentiment and home prices may therefore be 
“spiral”, which presents a compelling explanation for the high volatility and 
susceptibility of house prices to bubbles. 
Examining the link between house prices and sentiment is important for 
several reasons. Because housing equity is the largest source of wealth for many 
homeowners, rapid house price increases and declines can have a significant impact 
on consumption and investment, and thus national economic growth (Riddle, 1999). 
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The source of house price volatility is therefore of great interest to policy makers. If 
sentiment is indeed an important driving force for homebuyers, housing prices are 
then inherently unstable (Case & Shiller, 2003). In the short run, prices can deviate 
from fundamental values depending on the sentiment agents have about the market, 
thereby increasing volatility. In the long run, the slow information revelation process 
means that sentiment-induced mispricing can accelerate more quickly in housing 
markets than in other more liquid asset markets, causing prices to be highly prone to 
explosive bubbles. As witnessed in the latest U.S. housing turmoil that subsequently 
triggered a global financial crisis, house price busts are also closely associated with 
loan default and foreclosure, leading to high costs in the banking and financial 
industry. The dynamic relationship between sentiment and house prices therefore has 
important implications for the economy as a whole. 
 
3. Scope of study and research design 
This study examines the U.S. housing market between 1990Q2-2010Q3. To 
measure and isolate sentiment’s effect, this thesis employs proxies that appear to 
capture the consensus sentiment of three major agents in the U.S. housing markets: 
homebuyers (demand side), builders (supply side) and residential mortgage lenders 
(intermediaries). These sentiment measures are derived from surveys conducted on a 
frequent basis by the University of Michigan, the National Association of Home 
Builders, and the Federal Reserve Board. These surveys purport to gauge the 
perceptions of respondents on the prevailing housing market conditions and are 
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available at the national level. The sentiment indicators derived from the surveys are 
then used to explain movements in the Case-Shiller National Home Price Index over 
the study period.  
Using a vector autoregressive regression (VAR) framework, this study is able 
to account for a potential bi-directional interaction between sentiment and home 
prices. To preview the results, it is found that the sentiment of all three housing 
market agents influences house price appreciations in subsequent quarters. 
Specifically, high levels of sentiment predict significantly greater price appreciation. 
A one-standard-deviation shock to household, builder and lender sentiment induces a 
60 to 80 basis points increase in house prices over the next two quarters. These 
figures are economically meaningful relative to the average price change of 0.71% 
per quarter over the whole sample period. This sentiment-induced component 
becomes much larger during episodes of fast escalating and slumping house prices 
(i.e., the formation and bursting of housing bubbles) than in more moderate periods. 
Moreover, this sentiment effect persists over a sustained period of time. In the long 
run, however, sentiment is found to be negatively related to the future five-year 
average house prices as the correction process starts to take place. The results also 
suggest evidence that increased price appreciation predicts higher levels of sentiment 
in subsequent quarters among homebuyers and lenders. The dynamic interplay 
between sentiment and home prices is therefore a self-reinforcing process. However, 
home builders do not appear to be backward-looking.  
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 The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows: 
 Chapter 2 reviews some literature on related topics; 
 Chapter 3 explains the data collection process and empirical models; 
 Chapter 4 discusses the empirical results; 
 Chapter 5 presents the robustness tests; 
 Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and their limitations, as well as discusses 
some further research directions.  
 10 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
 
 This chapter provides a broad summary of the relevant literature on housing 
markets that have been established by previous studies. The discussion will start with 
some major fundamental issues and stylized facts about housing price dynamics. It 
further goes on to explore the key viewpoints on mispricing in housing markets as 
well as housing bubbles, where the role of sentiment is acknowledged but not yet 
directly examined. The third section is a discussion on some prominent work in 
behavioural housing research, which is still a relatively new field. Finally, this 
chapter ends with a brief summary and highlight of the contribution this study aims to 
make for the present literature. 
 
1. House price dynamics 
1.1. Fundamentals of house prices  
 House price determinants is undoubtedly a well-researched field. Economic 
theory shows that house prices are essentially determined by supply and demand, 
which in turns are driven by economic fundamentals. Empirically, the literature that 
focuses on demand factors often considers population growth, GDP, income, 
unemployment rate, interest rate, etc., whilst housing supply is influenced primarily 
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by construction cost and interest rates (see, for example, Mankiw and Weil, 1989; 
Peek and Wilcox, 1991; Abraham and Hendershott, 1992; DiPasquale and Wheaton, 
1994; Meen, 2002; Hwang and Quigley, 2006). On the impact of demographic 
changes on housing demand, Mankiw and Weil (1989) assess the 1950s baby boom 
and the 1970s baby bust in the U.S. They demonstrate that the increase in real 
housing prices in the 1970s was due largely to the entry of the baby boom generation. 
Following that, they predict housing demand to grow only slowly in the 1990s as the 
baby bust generation enters their home-buying age, causing real house prices in 2007 
to be 47 per cent lower than the 1987 level.  
 A number of studies focus on the proposition that in a well-functioning 
market, house prices and economic fundamentals are cointegrated in the long run. For 
example, Malpezzi (1999) employs data of 133 MSAs in the U.S. to provide evidence 
for cointegration between house prices and income during 1979-1996. Using 
transaction-level data from the Parisian market, Meese and Wallace (2003) model 
housing prices as a function of construction cost, interest rate, employment and real 
income. They find a long-tem equilibrium relation between economic fundamentals 
and house price movements over the 1986–1992 period, with an adjustment rate of 
about 33-40 per cent per month.  
 When revisiting the issue of cointegration between house prices and 
fundamentals, Zhou (2010) criticizes that prior studies have always assumed a linear 
relationship. He argues that, if exists, the cointegration relationship between house 
prices and economic fundamentals can take any form, depending on the underlying 
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data generating process. Zhuo (2010) thus examines and finds a non-linear form of 
cointergation for 10 cities in the U.S. using data from 1978 to 2007.  
 In contrast, the work of Gallin (2006) fails to find evidence supporting a stable 
long-run relation between house prices and fundamentals. Arguing that the standard 
tests applied on times series in previous studies have low power, Gallin (2006) uses a 
bootstrap approach on panel data, which he claims to be a more powerful test, of 95 
MSAs in the U.S. to test the link between house price and income over the period 
1975-2002. Contrary to other studies supporting a stable equilibrium condition, his 
result does not indicate any cointegration relationship between them, at least at levels. 
 
1.2. House price anomalies 
 Notwithstanding the voluminous housing literature, numerous challenges in 
understanding the housing markets still remain to date. For long, market observers 
have been puzzled by the high volatility of house prices with not only large time-
varying fluctuations but also wide geographical variations. As documented in Glaeser 
et al. (2010), the three-year real changes of average house prices in their sample of 
113 MSAs range from about $6,500 in Sunbelt markets to as high as $30,000 in 
coastal markets.  
 On the geographical disparities in house price volatility of different local 
markets, the common finding among related studies points to housing supply 
elasticity as the main underlying cause, where supply elasticity is typically measured 
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by local topography and land use regulation strictness. Miller and Peng (2006), for 
example, find that housing markets in metropolitan areas with constrained housing 
supply seem more sensitive and respond more dramatically to shocks, together with 
longer shock effect. This empirical evidence is in line with the theoretical model of 
house prices in Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) which predicts that places with 
more elastic housing supply have fewer and shorter bubbles, with smaller price 
increases.7
 Early studies on housing market efficiency have documented both serial 
correlation (Case and Shiller, 1989; Cutler, Poterba, and Summers, 1991) and mean 
reversion in the time-series behaviours of house prices (Abraham and Hendershott, 
1996; Malpezzi, 1999; Meen, 2002).  The seminal work of Case and Shiller (1989) 
has been followed by a large stream of literature focusing on the serial correlation and 
forecastability of housing prices.  Their paper establishes that price changes tend to be 
followed by changes in the same direction in subsequent years; the weak-form 
efficiency hypothesis for the housing markets is therefore rejected. Following Case 
and Shiller’s work, empirical studies attempting to model house prices usually 
include lagged values as an important variable. The positive serial correlation, 
however, persists only in the short-run. As has been observed for other asset classes, 
over the long horizon house prices also exhibit a negative serial correlation, or a 
 They further employ data of the housing boom and bust cycle 1980 - 2007 
to empirically test their model prediction, which show that the price run-ups of the 
1980s were almost exclusively experienced in cities where housing supply is more 
inelastic.  
                                                          
7 However, the consequences of bubbles may be higher in more elastic places because those 
places tend to overbuild more in response to a bubble (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008). 
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mean-reverting trend. The common approach used for testing this behaviour is an 
error-correction framework where prices gradually adjust to disequilibrium conditions 
(see, for example, Malpezzi, 1999; Meen, 2002; Meese and Wallace, 2003). 
 Although attempts to explain the above price behaviours are voluminous, the 
consensus in this area is that a fully satisfactory answer is still non-existent to date. 
Recently, Glaeser, Gyourko, Morales and Nathanson (2010) calibrate a dynamic 
rational expectation model to reconcile the above puzzling stylized facts about 
housing prices: high volatility, serial correlation and mean reverting behaviors. They 
test its prediction power by fitting the model with two sets of data for 1990-2004 and 
1980-2003 from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, respectively. Although their model is able to explain mean reversion and 
price volatility over a one-year horizon, it substantially underpredicts price volatility 
over time horizons longer than a year; moreover, the model fails to account for serial 
correlation. The authors offer to two explanations for the inability of their model to 
predict serial correlation in house prices. The first is that serial correlation might be 
the result of a learning process during which households and other market participants 
gradually infer the state of housing demand from prices. The second, less rational, 
explanation is essentially the extrapolation hypothesis; that is, market participants 
with myopic expectations infer future price growth from past price changes. Glaeser 
et al. (2010) thus conclude that the long-term price volatility and serial correlation of 
house prices remain important unresolved issues.  
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2. Mispricing and housing bubbles 
 Given their important implications for the overall economy, housing bubbles 
have long attracted much work from housing economists. At the center of this issue is 
the identification of the existence of bubbles. In the 1990 symposium on asset 
bubbles, a widely accepted definition was put forth by Stiglitz (1990): “If the reason 
that the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling price is 
high tomorrow – when ‘fundamental’ factors do not seem to justify such a price – 
then a bubble exists”. Two main barometers of bubbles emerge from the above 
definition: the activities of investors, and the extent of deviations from fundamentals. 
Yet, there are still much debate and contradictory conclusions among studies on this 
area, owing to the challenges in estimating fundamental prices and quantifying 
speculation. 
 The literature has broadly considered three alternative approaches to 
determine fundamental house prices: (1) finance-based models that relate prices to the 
discounted values of rents and user cost of ownership (Porteba, 1984, Himmerlberg, 
Mayer and Sinai, 2005), (2) a cost approach that compares house prices to cost of 
construction (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008), and finally, (3) assuming an 
equilibrium state between house prices and fundamental variables such as income or 
population (Abraham & Hendershott, 1996; Wheaton and Nechayev, 2008). 
Regardless of the methodology employed, the common inference is that there exists a 
bubble if actual house prices differ greatly from the estimated fundamental prices. 
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 Lacking an instrument to measure speculation, most researchers adopt an 
indirect approach which consists of decomposing actual price appreciation into two 
components: the portion driven by fundamentals and the residual amount assumed to 
be driven by speculative activities. Riddle (1999) defines speculators or feedback 
traders as those who trade on price expectations formed by past price movements 
rather than expected fundamentals.8
                                                          
8  Riddle (1999) further distinguishes these “feedback traders” from “fundamental traders”. Both 
can be categorized as speculators (as opposed to conventional homebuyers who consume housing 
services), but the later base their purchase and sale on forecasts of future economic conditions. Hence, 
fundamental investors are more likely to buy when prices are low relative to expected economic 
fundamentals, and vice versa. These “fundamental traders” therefore do not cause distortions in the 
market. 
 The trading activity of speculators can lead to 
price undershooting or overshooting, thereby increasing price volatility. Riddle 
(1999) points to the speculative house price bubble experienced in Santa Barbara 
South Coast in late 1987 as evidence for his hypothesis. Similarly, Levin and Wright 
(1997) model speculators as forming their expectations about future capital gains 
from historical price growth. Based on a UK sample, they find that speculation is a 
determinant of house prices. More recently, Piazzesi & Schneider (2009) presents a 
theoretical search model to illustrate the effects of optimistic, or momentum, traders 
on house prices. In their model, optimists can drive up prices significantly even when 
they constitute only a small proportion of total market shares in a search market. 
Empirically, Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) show that forecast errors of house price 
appreciation between 1998 and 2005 are positively correlated with the proportion of 
homes sales attributed to investors or second-home buyers. Working on the role of 
investors in the recent housing crisis, Haughwout et al. (2011) also contend that in 
states that experienced the largest housing booms and busts, at the peak of the 
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housing market almost half of purchase mortgage originations were associated with 
investors. 
   Popular explanations in the housing economics literature for the remarkable 
house price run-up between 1998 and 2006 include cheap credit (Himmelberg, Mayer 
and Sinai, 2005; Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko, 2010), easy credit and subprime 
lending (Wheaton and Nechayev, 2008; Mayer and Sinai, 2009), Lai and Order, 
2010;). Mayer and Sinai (2009), in particular, show that the growth in subprime 
lending was largest in housing markets with the biggest growth in price-rent ratios. 
Mayer and Pence (2009) further document that the median loan-to-value ratio of a 
housing loan was an astounding 100% for subprime mortgages originated in 2005, 
2006 and the first half of 2007. Another explanation for house price movements 
considered in the literature concerns the effect of supply restrictions, whereby places 
with more inelastic supply experience more and longer bubbles, with larger price 
increases (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008). 
 In addition to the above fundamental factors, with the rising popularity of 
behavioural research, there has been growing interest in the role of non-rational 
factors in explaining bubbles. In a recent working paper, Glaeser, Gottlieb & 
Gyourko (2010) find that easy credit cannot be fully blamed for the drastic price 
gyrations in the recent housing boom9
                                                          
9  Indeed, over the long 1996-2006 boom, they observe that falling interest rates only explain 
about 20% of the rise in house prices. Neither can the approval rates or down payment requirements 
account for most of the movement in house prices. 
. They conclude their paper citing the 
unrealistic price expectations found from the survey in Case & Shiller (2003) as a 
plausible alternative explanation.  Several questions about the role and cause of 
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irrational exuberance are then raised as pressing topics for future research to resolve 
this missing piece of the house price puzzle. The next section will discuss some major 
work in the field of behavioural housing research. 
 
3. Behavioral research in housing economics 
 The first prominent study to directly employ behavioural theories in housing 
markets is perhaps that by Genesove and Mayer (2001). Their paper attributes the 
long-standing puzzle of a positive correlation between housing prices and trading 
volume to the loss aversion behaviors of sellers in a down market. As loss-averse 
sellers face potential loss due to house price declines, they have an incentive to set 
higher reservation prices, resulting in longer time-on-market and lower sale hazard. A 
number of studies have also provided some insights into how homebuyers form their 
perceptions about housing markets, albeit limited. Housing market players are found 
to overreact to income growth in Capozza & Seguin (1996). The initial overreaction 
of prices to income growth, or what they call “euphoria”, results in lower prices in the 
next decade. Hamilton & Schwab (1985) examine if homebuyers’ expectations of 
price appreciation are rational, in the sense that they can efficiently incorporate all 
available information in their expectations. Measuring expected appreciation rate as 
embedded in rent-to-value ratios, they find that expectations were systematically 
wrong during 1974-1976. In particular, the market misinterpreted past price growth as 
signalling lower capital gains in the future whilst indeed the reverse was true. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
19 
Apparently, misusing this important piece of information raises doubt to the rational 
expectation hypothesis in housing markets10
 In a more recent paper, Dua (2008) uses the Michigan Survey of Consumers 
to identify the factors influencing homebuyers’ perception about buying houses. 
Interest rates, income, wealth, financial status and current house prices are found to 
Granger-cause home buying attitudes, among which interest rate plays the most 
influential role. Interestingly, the impulse response functions show that a rise in 
current house prices induces a positive buying sentiment in the short run but becomes 
a negative impact over longer horizons. Nevertheless, Dua (2008) does not focus on 
the possibility of a reverse causality from sentiment to home prices.  
.  
 In fact, no research in the current literature has directly tested the role of 
sentiment in setting house prices. Instead, it is only indirectly inferred from price 
deviations from their fundamental values. Clayton (1996, 1997), for example, 
documents a short run pricing error in house prices which he attributes to 
psychological factors. Similarly, Meese & Wallace (1994) find that although house 
prices and market fundamentals are cointegrated in the long run, the relationship does 
not hold in the short run. Prior studies such as Abraham & Hendershott (1996), Hui & 
Yue, (2006), and Wheaton & Nechayev (2008) have also adopted this approach to 
identify the presence of housing bubbles. A common inference drawn from these 
studies is that housing markets are characterized by irrational price expectations and 
house prices, at times, deviate from their fundamental values. However, as most 
                                                          
10 Their result should, however, be interpreted with caution due to the short study period and data 
limitation (Hamilton & Schwab, 1985). 
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authors point out themselves, such an indirect approach often suffers from the 
criticism that their findings of mispricing might be the result of model 
misspecifications rather than of any meaningful effect. 
 During the most recent housing boom, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), using 
the Michigan Survey of Consumers, conclude there was an increasing cluster of 
“momentum” agents who believed prices would rise further. Prior to the bursting of 
the bubble, Case and Shiller (2003) conducted a survey of homebuyers in four U.S. 
MSAs. They find that home purchase decisions during this period were driven to a 
large extent by optimistic expectations and “excitement” – an evident sign of a 
bubble. In addition, euphoria on the part of banks also played a crucial role in the 
recent bubble (Archer and Smith, 2011). During periods of rising prices, euphoria 
induces borrowers to willingly take on more risk; in addition, underwriters rationalize 
their risky lending by pointing to anticipated house price increases and the associated 
reduction in perceived default risk. Shleifer and Vishny (2010) also propose a 
theoretical model in which banks cater to investor sentiment through their 
participation in financial markets. Overall, the literature suggests that although market 
agents make rational use of much of the information available to them, misbeliefs are 
still rather pervasive in housing markets. 
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4. Summary  
 In general, most economists agree that house prices are dictated in the long-
run by economic fundamentals such as income, population, employment and rents. 
However, in the short-run market imperfections might lead to house prices 
overshooting or undershooting the fundamentals. Despite significant variation in 
hypotheses, modeling techniques, and data, much of the existing empirical literature 
acknowledges that actual house prices are seen rather volatile and susceptible to 
bubbles, which are hard to perfectly reconcile with rational models. Some researchers 
have therefore suggests non-rational explanations such as exuberance and unrealistic 
expectations of future price appreciation.  
 Thus far, no research has directly examined the dynamic relation between 
sentiment and house prices. Rather, sentiment is often inferred indirectly through 
price deviations from fundamental values based on real construction cost inflation, 
income multiples, or present value of rents. However, the main limitation of 
attributing a portion of the perceived mispricing to sentiment is the absence of precise 
valuation models. This makes it difficult to attribute the deviations convincingly to 
either actual mispricing or model misspecification. Unlike previous work, this study 
employs a set of proxies that appear to capture the consensus sentiment of three major 
agents in the U.S. housing markets: homebuyers (demand side), builders (supply side) 
and residential mortgage lenders (intermediaries). This allows for a direct 
examination of the dynamic relationship between sentiment and house prices, 
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Chapter 3 - Data and Methodology 
 
 
1. Empirical model – Vector Autoregression 
 A Vector Autogression (VAR) model is an n-equation, n-variable linear 
model in which each variable is in turn explained by its own lagged values, together 
with past values of the remaining n - 1 variables. An unrestricted pth-order Gaussian 
VAR model can be represented as: 
Yt = µ + Π1Yt−1 + Π2Yt−2 + ⋯+ ΠpYt−p + εt              (1) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is a vector of variables; 𝜇 is a (p × 1) vector of intercepts; 𝛱1, 𝛱2 …, 𝛱𝑡−𝑝  
are (p × p) matrices of parameters with all eigenvalues of 𝛱 having moduli less than 
one so that the VAR is stationary; and 𝜀𝑡  is a vector of uncorrelated structural shocks 
[∼ NID(0,Ω)]. Since the VAR(p) is in the form of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
model where each equation has the same explanatory variables, each equation may be 
estimated separately by Ordinary Least Squares without loss of efficiency.  
 In this research, the dynamic relationship between housing market sentiment 
and housing prices is modeled in a VAR framework with two endogenous variables 
both expressed as linear functions of their own and each other’s lagged values: 
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𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡       (2) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡         (3) 
where RETURNt is the percentage change in real house prices and SENTIMENTt 
represents one of the three proxies for homebuyers’, builders’ and lenders’ sentiment. 
It is essentially a Granger-causality test between market sentiment and house price 
appreciation. The model includes constant terms to allow for the possibility that the 
series have non-zero means11
 The relation between sentiment and house prices is modeled using a lag 
structure to avoid endogeneity issues and to recognize the nature of housing data. 
Since a sale transaction typically takes at least three months to be completed, any 
price movement in a quarter could only be reflected in the next quarter’s statistics. As 
a result, in practice the impact of sentiment on current prices can only be observed 
with lags. On the other hand, data on house prices (measured by the Case-Shiller U.S. 
Home Price Index) are released by Standard and Poors only with a two-month lag.  Its 
effect on sentiment, if any, should therefore be felt in the next quarter rather than the 
concurrent quarter. 
. 
 In addition to a lag structure of the endogenous variables, Equation (2) 
controls for a set of economic fundamentals (𝑧𝑡) that have been shown in the 
literature to be important determinants of housing prices. These control variables 
include the growth in the population of individuals between 20 and 30 years of age 
                                                          
11       The mean of RETURN (reported in Table 1 below) is significantly different from zero, while the 
means of the SENTIMENT variables are zero. For robustness, a model with suppressed constant terms 
has also been estimated (results not reported), which yielded similar results to the reported model. 
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(POP), real GDP growth (GDP), real income growth (INC), the change in 
unemployment rate (UNEMP), the change in the real interest rate (INT), and the 
change in housing supply (SUPPLY). Changes in the control variables are measured 
from quarter t-1 to t. Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is employed to 
simultaneously estimate Equations (2) and (3) using quarterly data over the 1990:Q2 - 
2010:Q3 sample period. 
The VAR system specified above allows for a feedback relationship between 
sentiment and house prices. Of primary interest in this study is the estimated 
coefficients on sentiment (𝛽1𝑖).  The impact of market sentiment on housing prices is 
arguably through the demand side. When potential buyers believe that prices are very 
unlikely to fall, they are more willing to make housing investments because of either 
less perceived risk or high potential price appreciation.12
                                                          
12 The two major types of buyers that will be highly motivated include (1) first-time homebuyers 
who act swiftly for fear of being priced out of the market, and (2) speculators who search for excess 
returns from the price momentum. These optimistic buyers will further be encouraged with easier and 
cheaper access to credit if developers and creditors share the same optimism. As a result, the market 
will experience an increase in speculative demand, driving prices away from fundamental values. The 
reverse can occur in “gloomy” periods. 
 Riddle (1999) posits that 
once price begins to rise, positive feedback traders enter the market in search of 
momentum profits and accentuate the rise; in contrast, during periods of price 
declines feedback traders exacerbate price movements through their selling activities. 
In the recent housing boom, Case and Shiller (2003) have also demonstrated that 
many homebuyers made their purchase decisions for fear of being unable to afford 
one subsequently.  Moreover, financial intermediaries were believed to be the key to 
translate this overoptimism into real actions through their risky lending activities 
(Archer and Smith, 2011).   
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 Evidence of the reverse causality from prices to sentiment suggests myopic 
expectations. When prices are increasing (decreasing), market participants 
(mistakenly) believe that prices will continue to increase (decrease). The estimated 
coefficients on 𝛾2𝑖 is thus expected to be positive. The dynamic relationship between 
sentiment and home prices may therefore “spiral”, with one reinforcing the other. The 
illiquidity, low transaction volumes, limits to arbitrage, and information asymmetry 
that characterize housing markets may reinforce such a “spiral” effect and extend the 
length and magnitude of the cycle, as seen in the recent bubble.  
 
2. Measure of housing prices 
 To measure house price appreciation (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡), this study uses the 
percentage change in the real Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (nominal 
index deflated by the CPI-less-shelter). The Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price 
Index is a composite price index for single-family homes from all nine U.S. Census 
divisions, released quarterly by Standard and Poors (see 
www.standardandpoors.com). It is constructed using the repeat sale method 
developed by Case and Shiller in the 1980s based on matched sale pairs of existing 
single-family homes.  
 Over the past 20 years, U.S. home prices as measured by the Case-Shiller 
index in Figure 1 have experienced three episodes: stagnation, escalation and 
collapse. The index stayed relatively flat over a long period between 1990-1996 
following the housing burst in 1989. Since 1997, the subsequent ten years saw prices 
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steadily and rapidly increase to a historical high level in an infamous housing bubble 
that has spurred abundant debates on its sustainability. Research have largely focused 
on the role of cheap and easy credit (Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko, 2010), subprime 
lending (Mayer and Pence, 2009; Lai and Van Order, 2010), and speculation 
(Wheaton and Nechavey, 2008) in driving the bubble but acknowledge their inability 
to fully account for the excessive price run-up. When the bubble burst, over just 
twelve quarters prices plunged by 31% from its peak in 2006Q1, bottoming out in 
2009 and remaining stagnant in the last two years.    
Figure 1. U.S. house prices 1990Q2-2010Q3 
This figure plots the Case-Shiller National U.S. Home Price Index and real price appreciation over the 
1990Q2-2010Q3 period. Real price appreciation is measured by the quarter-on-quarter change (in 
percentage)  in the Case-Shiller index deflated by the CPI-less-shelter. 
 
 In terms of real price appreciation, measured by the quarter-on-quarter change 
in the nominal Case-Shiller index deflated by the CPI-less-shelter, Figure 1 shows 
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trending upwards until 2005. This confirms that in parallel with nominal prices, real 
prices were also escalating during the bubble. Similarly, the rate of real price increase 
started to moderate before prices fell and became negative in 2006 as the bubble 
burst. After three years of rapid depreciation, real prices seemed to show minor signs 
of recovery with some positive growth rates in 2009-2010 but a solid trend is still yet 
to emerge.   
 
3. Measure of housing market sentiment 
 Sentiment, broadly defined in behavioral finance research, is the misguided 
belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by current 
information (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Several proxies of investor sentiment have 
been developed for stock and commercial markets.13
                                                          
13  Baker and Wurgler (2007) provide a comprehensive discussion of the various common proxies for 
investor sentiment in the stock market. Note that investor sentiment is by no means a new area in the 
securitized real estate literature. For example, see Barkham and Ward (1999), Chiang and Lee (2010), 
and Lin, Rahman and Yung (2009) for the impact of investor sentiment on REIT prices as well as 
discounts to net-asset-value. In recent years, more attention has also been paid to the noise trader 
approach in private real estate markets for commercial properties (Clayton, Ling and Naranjo, 2009; 
Ling, 2005; Ling, Naranjo and Scheick, 2010). 
 These sentiment indicators can 
be broadly categorized as either direct or indirect measures. Indirect proxies for 
investor sentiment are abstracted from a broad range of quantifiable market 
indicators, such as closed-end fund discounts, trading volume, mutual fund flows, 
IPO and SEO volume. In contrast, direct sentiment measures are often derived from 
surveys of market participants intended to capture their outlook about the markets, 
such as the UBS/Gallup surveys of randomly-selected investor households, Investor’s 
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Intelligence surveys of financial newsletter writers, and the University of Michigan 
Survey of Consumers.14
 This thesis focuses on the direct measures, or survey-based measures, of 
market sentiment in its analysis. Baker & Wurgler (2007) and Case and Shiller (2003) 
have argued that simply by asking people what they are thinking, researchers can gain 
insights into their decision making process or emotional charge. For example, Carroll, 
Fuhrer, & Wilcox (1994) use the University of Michigan Index of Consumer 
Sentiment to forecast homebuyer spending and study if sentiment indeed causes 
changes in spending. For investor sentiment in the stock market, Brown & Cliff 
(2004, 2005) use Investors’ Intelligence surveys to calculate the “bull-bear” spread as 
the percentage of bullish stock investment newsletters minus the percentage deemed 
bearish, and relate it to stock price deviations from fundamental values. In the real 
estate literature, Ling (2005), Clayton, Ling, and Naranjo (2009) and Ling, Naranjo, 
and Scheick (2010) employ survey data published by the Real Estate Research 
Corporation (RERC) as a measure of investor sentiment to examine its impact on 
commercial property returns. RERC surveys institutional real estate investors, 
appraisers, lenders, and managers throughout the US to gain information about their 
expected rates of return, property selection criteria, and investment outlook.  
  
 Along similar lines, the sentiment indicators used in this paper are taken from 
surveys of homebuyers, builders, and mortgage lenders by various institutions in the 
                                                          
14   Qiu and Welch (2005) provide a comparison of several direct survey-based measures of investor 
sentiment. 
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U.S. These are the three major types of agents representing the demand, supply and 
intermediary side of the housing markets.  
 
3.1. Measure of homebuyers’ sentiment 
 The sentiment of homebuyers is addressed in the Survey of Consumers 
conducted monthly by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan (see 
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/). Founded in 1946, the center was developed on 
behavioral economics theories that focus on the “human factor” in economic affairs 
(Curtin, 1982)15. The survey has become a familiar source of information on 
consumer sentiment that is widely used by not only researchers but also practitioners 
and institutions16
 For each monthly sample of respondents, approximately 500 households from 
all states in the U.S. are chosen using a rotating panel sample design.  Each survey 
contains approximately 50 core questions to track consumers’ attitudes and 




                                                          
15 Since change in attitudes and expectations occurs in advance of action, measures of consumer 
attitudes and expectations can act as leading indicators of aggregate economic activities (Curtin, 1982).  
. For housing sentiment, this thesis focuses on the survey question 
 
16 The Index of Consumer Expectations, produced from the survey, is included in the Leading 
Indicator Composite Index published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
 
17 Personal finances are addressed in questions about expected change in nominal as well as real 
family income.  Attitudes towards business conditions in the economy are measured using 
questionnaire concerning expected changes in inflation, unemployment, interest rates, and confidence 
in government economic policies.  Finally, there are several questions probing for the respondent's 
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addressing respondents’ attitudes about home buying conditions: “Generally 
speaking, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to buy a house?” The 
responses fall into three broad categories:  “good”, “bad” and “uncertain”. The 
follow-up question asks respondents to provide reasons for their previous answers, 
which are then classified into six groups for the “good” response and four groups for 
the “bad” response. The six reasons for the “good” response include: “prices will 
increase”, “prices low”, “interest rates low”, “rising interest rates”, “good 
investment”, and “time’s good”. From these responses, the percentage of respondents 
who think it is a “good” time to buy “because price will increase” is chosen as the 
sentiment proxy for homebuyers18
 
 (BUYER). This percentage captures the proportion 
of homebuyers who are bullish about the market due to their optimistic expectations 
for rising prices. The survey data of the ending month of a given quarter (March for 
quarter 1, June for quarter 2, September for quarter 3, and December for quarter 4) is 
used as an indicator for homebuyers’ sentiment in that quarter. 
Figure 2 plots the proportion of “optimistic” respondents against the real 
price appreciation series (RETURN) over the study period. Not unexpectedly, 
households’ sentiment exhibits high volatility with no apparent pattern throughout the 
years, except in the recent bubble period when it moved in close tandem with price 
changes. Prior to the bubble, periods of remarkable low sentiment include 1991-1992, 
1998Q4 and 2001Q4-2003Q1. Since 2003, parallel with the steady rising trend of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
appraisal of buying conditions for large household durables, vehicles, and houses (see 
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/). 
 
18 The remaining reasons are not as clearly related to sentiment. Specifically, “prices low”, “interest 
rates low”, and “rising interest rates” are more likely to reflect prevailing market conditions than the 
subjective belief of the respondents, whilst “good investment” and “time’s good” are too ambiguous 
for interpretation. 
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house prices there was an increasing number of optimistic households expecting 
prices to continue upwards, which peaked precisely in the same quarter price 
appreciation reached its historical high level (2005Q1). Both series then fell 
drastically following the burst of the bubble to reach their bottom at about the same 
time (2008). The last two years (2009-2010) saw some slight improvement in both 
price growth rate and homebuyers’ sentiment.  
Figure 2. Homebuyers’ sentiment versus real price appreciation, 1990Q2-2010Q3 
This figure plots the percentage of households who think it is a “good” time to buy a house “because 
price will increase” from the Michigan Survey of Consumers against real price appreciation rates over 
1990Q2-2010Q3. Real price appreciation rate is measured by the quarter-on-quarter change (in 
percentage) in the Case-Shiller National Home Price Index less the change in the CPI-less-shelter. 
 
 
3.2. Measure of homebuilders’ sentiment 
To measure the perceptions of homebuilders about housing market conditions 
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published by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB). Founded in 1942, 
NAHB is a federation of more than 800 local associations of home builders and 
remodelers in the U.S. with the aim of being “the voice of America’s housing 
industry” (see www.nahb.org). An important service by NAHB is providing housing 
data and in-depth analyses of the industry. Various indices of the housing market 
constructed by NAHB, such as the NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index, 
Housing Opportunity Index or Improving Market Index, are closely followed by 
various Wall Street firms, government officials, economic analysts, as well as news 
media.  
NAHB reports the NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index monthly as an 
indicator of “builder confidence” about the housing market. Derived from a survey 
conducted monthly by NAHB since 1985, this index gauges the opinions of about 400 
builders regarding three aspects of housing market conditions: (1) current sales of 
single-family new homes, (2) expected sales of single-family new homes over the 
next six months, and (3) traffic of prospective buyers in new homes. The respondents 
are asked to rate their perceptions of the current and expected sales as "good," "fair" 
or "poor", and the traffic of prospective buyers as “high to very high,” “average” or 
“low to very low”. The final Housing Market Index (BUILDER) is a weighted 
average of the three component indices19
                                                          
19 The three component indices are calculated by applying the formula [(Good - Poor + 100)/2] to the 
present and future sales series, and [(High/Very High - Low/Very Low + 100)/2] to the traffic 
series. This formula puts each index on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. The indices are then seasonally 
adjusted (see 
, where their weights are based on their 
correlations with single-family housing starts. The index can range between 0 and 
100, with an index number over 50 indicating that more builders view sales 
http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?sectionID=134&genericContentID=532). 
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conditions as good than poor. Similar to the homebuyer survey series, this research 
uses the index value of the ending month of a given quarter as an indicator of 
builders’ sentiment for that quarter.  
As shown in Figure 3, builders’ confidence level was generally increasing 
from 1990 to 2006 with the exceptions of some major slippage in 1994 and 1999-
2001. Both of these downward movements in the confidence index seemed to 
coincide with two periods of rising interest rates that have a pronounced dampening 
effect on the mortgage market, which in turn affected home sale prospects. The U.S. 
economy also experienced a 9-month long recession in 2001 which partly contributed 
to the low sentiment during 1999-2001. However, overall the index remained high 
above 50 for more than ten years since 1996, corresponding with increasing price 
growth over this period. It can be observed that since 2002 throughout the recent 
bubble, there is a remarkably high correlation between movements in builders’ 
sentiment and real price appreciation rate. At the worst of the crisis the index fell 
sharply to a historical low of 9 from its previous peak of 72 in 2005Q2. Builders have 
not shown much improvement in their sentiment even until 2010Q3. 
 
3.3. Measure of mortgage lenders’ sentiment 
 The measure of credit suppliers’ opinion about housing markets is obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Board (FED)’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on 
Bank Lending Practices (see www.federalreserve.gov). This is a quarterly survey of 
approximately sixty large domestic banks and twenty-four US branches or agencies  
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Figure 3. Homebuilders’ sentiment versus real price appreciation, 1990Q2-2010Q3 
This figure plots the NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index against real price appreciation rates 
over1990Q2-2010Q3. Real price appreciation rate is measured by the quarter-on-quarter change (in 
percentage) in the Case-Shiller National Home Price Index less the change in the CPI-less-shelter. 
 
 
of foreign banks. The purpose of the survey is to provide qualitative and limited 
quantitative information on credit availability and demand, as well as evolving 
developments and lending practices in the U.S. loan markets20
                                                          
20   Survey questions focus on two broad areas: changes in demand for credit, and changes in bank 
lending policies. Various types of loans are covered in the survey, including commercial and industrial 
loans, commercial real estate loans, residential real estate loans, and consumer lending. In addition, a 
portion of the questions in each survey also covers special topics of timely interest, such as the 
securitization of mortgage loans, the financial crisis, etc. 
.  The survey results are 
reported regularly to the Board of Governors and to the Federal Open Market 
Committee. Information from the survey also attracts much attention from both the 
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 This study focuses on the responses to the following survey question: “Over 
the past three months, how have your bank's credit standards for approving 
applications from individuals for mortgage loans to purchase homes changed?” 
Respondents must select one of the following options: “tightened considerably”, 
“tightened somewhat”, “remained essentially unchanged”, “eased somewhat”, or 
“eased considerably”. Since banks are concerned with the ability to recover their 
loans, it follows that that changes in lending standards for home mortgages reflect 
their changing perspectives about the riskiness of the housing markets21
 Unlike the homebuyers’ and builders’ series, lenders’ sentiment as shown in 
. Thus, in this 
thesis lenders’ sentiment (LENDER) is indicated by the net percentage of banks 
easing their standards (percentage of banks easing their standards minus percentage 
of banks tightening their standards). 
Figure 4 stayed relatively stable over the study period prior to the turmoil in 2006. 
Their sentiment saw significant improvement in only one year after the 1989 housing 
bust as more and more banks loosened their credit standards. The series peaked in 
1993Q2 and stabilized thereafter. The year 2006 marked the start of an exceptionally 
low sentiment period as the housing market burst.  At the worst of the crisis as many 
as 78% of the surveyed lenders tightened their credit lines for the home mortgage 
                                                          
21   Take, for example, the 2010Q4 survey. The top three reasons cited by the respondents for 
tightening their credit standards for commercial and industrial loans include: “less favorable or more 
uncertain economic outlook”, “reduced tolerance of risk”, and “increased concerns about the effects of 
legislative changes, supervisory actions, or changes in accounting standards”. Conversely, banks 
easing their credit standards for commercial and industrial loans cited “more favorable or less 
uncertain economic outlook”, “improvement in industry-specific problems” and “more aggressive 
competition from other banks or nonbank lenders” as their motivation. Apparently when making loan 
initiation, banks take into account their outlook for the riskiness of the specific market they are lending 
to. Although there is no question to address the reasons for changing credit standards for home 
mortgage loans, it is reasonable to believe banks are motivated by similar factors when making loans 
to the residential market. 
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market. Similar to other market agents, banks’ sentiment seemed to show signs of 
recovery in the last two years along with real price growth. 
Figure 4. Lenders’ sentiment versus real price appreciation, 1990Q2-2010Q3 
This figure plots the net percentage of banks easing their lending standard (percentage of banks easing 
their standards minus percentage of banks tightening their standards) against real price appreciation 
rates over1990Q2-2010Q3. Real price appreciation rate is measured by the quarter-on-quarter change 
(in percentage) in the Case-Shiller National Home Price Index less the change in the CPI-less-shelter. 
 
 
3.4. Orthogonalization of the sentiment series  
 BUYER, BUILDER and LENDER are likely to be correlated with economic 
factors such as GDP or income per capita.22
                                                          
22  For example, the contemporaneous correlations of BUYER, BUILDER and LENDER with real GDP 
growth are 0.28, 0.54, and 0.55 respectively. 
  As highlighted by Brown and Cliff 
(2005), when market participants say they are bullish on the market, this can be a 
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some combination of the two. Following Clayton, Ling and Naranjo (2009) and Baker 
and Wurgler (2007), this study orthogonalizes the three sentiment series against a set 
of macroeconomic variables to remove the influence of fundamentals. Their residuals 
are then used in the subsequent VAR analysis. The macroeconomic factors used in 
the orthogonalization regression include population growth, GDP growth, income 
growth, change in unemployment rate, and change in interest rate. As a robustness 
test, this thesis further constructs a composite sentiment index from the three indices 
which will be discussed in detail in a later section.  
 The descriptive statistics of the sentiment indices and house price appreciation 
variable are reported in Table 1. Over the study period, real house prices (RETURN) 
registered an average quarterly appreciation rate of 0.71 per cent, with both the 
maximum (5.07 per cent in 2005Q1) and minimum (-8.68 per cent in 2009Q1) 
appreciation occurring during the recent bubble period. The three sentiment indices 
BUYER, BUILDER and LENDER are well-behaved mean-zero series, as they are 
residuals from regressing the original series against a set of fundamental factors.23
 
 
Figure 5 plots the three sentiment indices against contemporaneous real house 
price changes over the 1990:Q2-2010:Q3 study period, in place of Figure 2 - Figure 
4 above. Note that after removing the information on the current economic 
conditions, lenders’ sentiment shows more variations when compared with Figure 4 
whilst the homebuyers’ and builders’ indices stay close to their original series. 
Among the three indices, home buyer sentiment is the least correlated with house   
                                                          
23 Tests with sentiment indices in changes have also been carried out, but sentiment in levels work 
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Table 1. Definition and descriptive statistics of dependent and sentiment variables 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sentiment proxies and house price appreciation variables. The study period covers 1990Q2-2010Q3. *, 
** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
Definition Variable Mean St.D. Min Max Serial correlation 
Dependent variable       
 Change in Case-Shiller real price index (percentage) RETURN 0.71 2.31 -8.68 5.07 0.60*** 
Sentiment indices       
 Percentage of respondents indicating it is good time to buy a home 
because price will increase (residuals from orthogonalization) 
BUYER 0.00 2.52 -4.67 7.53 0.52*** 
 NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index. An index number over 
50 indicates that more builders view sales conditions as good than 
poor (residuals from orthogonalization) 
BUILDER 0.00 14.65 -38.06 28.98 0.82*** 
 Percentage of banks easing home mortgage lending standards less 
percentage of banks tightening standards (residuals from 
orthogonalization) 
LENDER 0.00 14.55 -53.67 29.75 0.72*** 
 First principal component derived from BUYER, BUILDER and 
LENDER 
DSENT 0.00 1.36 -3.92 2.78 0.75*** 
 First principal component derived from home sales transaction 
volume, residential mortgage flows, and housing starts 
INSENT 0.00 1.61 -4.74 2.79 0.86*** 
 
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
40 
Figure 5. Sentiment and contemporaneous housing returns 
This figure plots the sentiment measures against contemporaneous housing returns for the time period 
1990:Q2-2010:Q3. The buyer sentiment measure (BUYER) is the residuals from regressing the 
percentage of homebuyers who think it is a good time to buy a home because price will increase on a 
set of macroeconomic factors.  The builder sentiment measure (BUILDER) is the residuals from 
regressing the NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index on a set of macroeconomic factors. The 
lender sentiment measure (LENDER) is the residuals from regressing the net percentage of banks 
easing their standards (percentage of banks easing their standards minus percentage of banks 
tightening their standards) on a set of macroeconomic factors. The set of macroeconomic factors used 
for orthogonalization include population growth, GDP growth, income growth, change in 
unemployment rate, and change in interest rate. The measure of housing returns is the quarterly 
changes in the real Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index. 
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price movements, especially during the 1995-2005 period when housing returns and 
the other two sentiment indices exhibit a consistent upward trend. Homebuyer 
sentiment, on the other hand, seems to move rather erratically during that period. This 
observation is confirmed through the contemporaneous correlation between house 
price changes and the sentiment indices, which are 0.21, 0.55 and 0.61 for 
homebuyers, builders and lenders respectively. 
 
4. Control variables   
 In addition to the sentiment of the major market participants, housing prices 
are also modeled as depending on various macroeconomic factors in Equation (2). 
The control variables (reported in Table 2) are specified in changes to reduce 
multicollinearity and ensure stationarity for VAR estimations. Data for these control 
variables are obtained from various sources, including the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Bureau of Census, and Bureau of Labor Statistics. On average, the U.S 
population between 20 and 30 years old, who are in their home-buying age (Mankiw 
and Weil, 1989), grew by 0.09% every quarter over the past 20 years. Meanwhile, the 
U.S economy expanded by 0.62% whereas real income increased by 0.41% per 
quarter. Notwithstanding the booming economy, the unemployment rate showed an 
average quarterly growth rate of 0.84% with the sharpest increase, not unexpectedly, 
due to the latest crisis. Housing supply as measured by the number of new housing 
units built in each quarter also increased by 0.55% every quarter. Finally, interest rate 
is the only control factor experiencing a reduction over the study period with an 
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average quarter-on-quarter change of -0.08%, consistent with the common accusation 
that the bubble was partly driven by abundant cheap credit.  
Table 2. Definition and descriptive statistics of control variables 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for our control variables. The study period covers 1990Q2-
2010Q3. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
 
  
 Overall, Table 3 shows that the sentiment series exhibit high positive 
correlations with each other but low correlations with other macroeconomic variables. 
It can therefore be concluded that multicolinearity is not a problem in the model, and 
more importantly, that the sentiment indicators reflect the sentiment component 
independent of any economic forces. This allows the estimated sentiment coefficients 
to be interpreted as the marginal effects of sentiment on house prices beyond 
fundamentals. 
  
Definition Variable Mean St.D. Min Max Serial Correlation 
Change in the population aged 
between 20-30 (percentage) POP 0.09 0.27 -0.45 0.45 0.96*** 
Real GDP growth (percentage) GDP 0.62 0.64 -1.74 1.95 0.49*** 
Real income growth (percentage) INCOME 0.41 0.84 -2.41 2.47 -0.27 
Change in unemployment rate 
(percentage) UNEMP 0.84 4.97 -6.11 18.84 0.69*** 
Change in real mortgage interest 
rate (percentage) MGTRATE -0.08 12.41 -31.62 74.66 -0.27 
Change in the quarterly number of 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix between explanatory variables 
This table reports the pair-wise correlation matrix between the explanatory variables. The sentiment indices include: BUYER is the residuals from regressing the 
percentage of homebuyers who think it is a good time to buy a home because price will increase on a set of macroeconomic factors; BUILDER is the residuals 
from regressing the NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index on a set of macroeconomic factors; LENDER is the residuals from regressing the net percentage 
of banks easing their standards (percentage of banks easing their standards minus percentage of banks tightening their standards) on a set of macroeconomic 
factors; DSENT is the first principal component extracted from the buyer sentiment measure (BUYER), builder sentiment measure (BUILDER) and lender 
sentiment measure (LENDER); INSENT is the first principal component extracted from housing transaction volume, residential mortgage flows and housing 
starts. The control variables include: POP is the percentage change in the population aged between 20-30; GDP is real GDP growth (percentage); INCOME is 
real per capita income growth (percentage); UNEMP is the percentage change in unemployment rate; MGTRATE is the percentage change in real mortgage rate; 
SUPPLY is the percentage change in the number of residential units completed in each quarter. 
 
Variable  BUYER BUILDER LENDER DSENT INSENT POP GDP INCOME UNEMP MGTRATE SUPPLY 


















































 GDP  GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.13 1.00  
 
  
 Income INCOME -0.01 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.31 1.00 
 
  
 Unemployment UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.70 -0.22 1.00   
 Mortgage rate MGTRATE -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.04 1.00  
 Supply SUPPLY -0.06 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.10 -0.04 0.25 0.12 -0.14 0.14 1.00 
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Chapter 4 - Empirical results 
 
 
1. VAR estimation results of base models 
 The Dickey-Fuller tests of all variables shown in Table 4 confirm that they are 
stationary. Table 5 presents the estimation results of the base VAR model specified in 
Equation (2) and (3) using MLE. Conventional lag-length selection criteria (Akaike 
information criterion, Schwarz information criterion, Hannan-Quinn criterion) 
indicate that two lags of all endogenous variables are most appropriate for the model 
specified. The first pair of equations in Table 5 corresponds to the homebuyer 
sentiment index (BUYER), the second pair the builder sentiment index (BUILDER) 
and the last pair the lender sentiment index (LENDER). Panel A reports the estimated 
coefficients and their individual significance levels while Panel B presents the sum of 
the lagged coefficients and tests of joint significance.  
Focusing first on the RETURN equations, Panel B shows that the estimated 
coefficients on all three lagged sentiment measures are positive and significant at 1% 
level. That is, high levels of sentiment Granger-cause increased price appreciation in 
subsequent quarters. Examining the individual coefficients on lagged sentiment in 
Panel A, the two-quarter lagged terms appear more significant than the one-period 
lags, both statistically and economically. The impulse response functions (IRFs) 
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Table 4. Augmented Dicker-Fuller tests of stationarity 
This table reports the t-statistics and p-values from the Augmented Dicker-Fuller tests of stationarity of 
all variables used. The null hypothesis is that the data has a unit root. 
Variable t-statistics p-value 
Real price appreciation RETURN -4.373 0.0000 
 Sentiment indices   
Buyers' sentiment BUYER -5.215 0.0000 
Builders' sentiment BUILDER -2.226 0.0144 
Lenders' sentiment LENDER -3.605 0.0003 
Direct sentiment index DSENT -3.188 0.0010 
Indirect sentiment index INSENT -1.66 0.0505 
 Other control variables   
Population POP -1.387 0.0846 
GDP  GDP -5.209 0.0000 
Income INCOME -11.779 0.0000 
Unemployment UNEMP -3.803 0.0001 
Mortgage rate MGTRATE -11.684 0.0000 
Supply SUPPLY -12.738 0.0000 
Null hypothesis: The data has a unit root. 
 
associated with these VAR estimations are displayed in Figure 6. They trace the 
impact of a one-standard-deviation shock to the residuals of the sentiment variables 
on subsequent house price changes.  A positive shock to household, builder and 
lender sentiment produces a 13.6, 10.7 and 21.6 basis points increase in house prices 
in the next quarter, respectively. The price responses rise further by 49.9, 48.0 and 
53.9 basis points, respectively, in the second quarter. In total, the effect of a one-
standard-deviation sentiment shock amounts to a cumulative price increase of about 
60 to 80 basis points within two quarters. These figures are not insignificant 
considering that the average price change over the whole sample period is 0.71 
percent per quarter (Table 1). Taken together, these findings strongly support the 
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Table 5. VAR estimation results of three sentiment indices 
This table reports the VAR estimation results with sentiment and housing returns as endogenous 
variables:  
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡    
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡      
The study period covers 1990Q2-2010Q3. Lag-length is chosen based on three selection criteria AIC, 
HQIC and SBIC. RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real Case-Shiller housing price 
index; BUYER is the homebuyer sentiment index; BUILDER is the builder sentiment index; LENDER 
is the lender sentiment index. All RETURN equations include a set of control variables 𝑧𝑡 but their 
coefficients are not reported for brevity: POP is the percentage change in the population aged between 
20-30; GDP is real GDP growth (percentage); INCOME is real per capita income growth (percentage); 
UNEMP is the percentage change in unemployment rate; MGTRATE is the percentage change in real 
mortgage rate; SUPPLY is the percentage change in the number of residential units completed in each 
quarter, and is used at the one-quarter lag to account for simultaneity. ADF tests show that all variables 
are stationary. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parentheses, unless otherwise stated. 
 
 















Panel A. Coefficient estimation results 
Constant -0.260 -0.376  0.323 -0.676  0.314 -1.200 
 (0.300) (0.234)  (0.301) (0.944)  (0.296) (1.208) 
SENTIMENTt-1 0.0671 0.374***  0.0157 0.545***  0.0285* 0.565*** 
 (0.0792) (0.109)  (0.0195) (0.108)  (0.0157) (0.110) 
SENTIMENTt-2 0.205*** 0.0573  0.0600*** 0.338***  0.0534*** 0.0206 
 (0.0768) (0.105)  (0.0199) (0.114)  (0.0169) (0.118) 
RETURNt-1 0.242** 0.312**  0.125 -0.0188  0.102 -0.167 
 (0.0976) (0.124)  (0.0977) (0.516)  (0.0984) (0.675) 
RETURNt-2 0.301*** 0.0171  0.153 0.478  0.186** 1.890*** 
 (0.0975) (0.128)  (0.0981) (0.515)  (0.0922) (0.636) 








































































Observations 80 80  80 80  80 80 
R-squared 0.685 0.340  0.676 0.722  0.638 0.578 
Panel B. Joint significance tests of estimated coefficients 
SENTIMENTt-2 to t-1 0.272*** 0.431***  0.076*** 0.883***  0.082*** 0.586*** 
(F-stat) (13.22) (18.39)  (24.16) (109.11)  (27.07) (36.91) 
RETURNt-2 to t-1 0.543*** 0.329***  0.278* 0.4592  0.288* 1.723*** 
(F-stat) (30.26) (10.44)  (5.57) (1.01)  (7.16) (9.56) 
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Figure 6. Impulse response functions of housing returns to three sentiment 
measures 
This figure plots the impulse response of housing returns  to a one standard deviation shock in the three 
sentiment measures, corresponding to the estimated VAR results in Table 5. The red lines are the +/- 
Standard Error responses. RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real Case-Shiller housing 
price index; BUYER is the homebuyer sentiment index; BUILDER is the builder sentiment index; 
LENDER is the lender sentiment index. 
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main proposition in this study that sentiment is a crucial determinant of house prices. 
To put it another way, the well-documented high volatility of house prices compared 
with observable changes in fundamentals can be ascribed, at least in part, to housing 
market sentiment. 
 Interestingly, the impulse response functions plotted in Figure 6 further show 
that the sentiment effect is highly persistent, which helps shed light on why housing 
markets are so susceptible to bubbles24
Table 5
. In particular, a shock in the sentiment index 
of any market-player appears to influence price changes for as long as 10 quarters. 
This protracted effect reflects the highly illiquid, segmented and informationally 
inefficient characteristics of housing markets. With some initial stimulating condition, 
such as an abundance of easy credit, the sentiment-induced mispricing inherent in 
house prices can spiral into a bubble. The findings in this research provide at least a 
partial answer to the question raised by Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2010) about 
the interplay between bubble, beliefs and credit condition. Regarding the serial 
correlation of house prices, this study finds that the estimated coefficient on lagged 
returns are still positive and jointly significant after controlling for sentiment, even 
though the significance of lagged returns seems to weaken with the inclusion of 
builder sentiment in the model (Column 3 of ). 
 The following discussion turns to the three SENTIMENT equations for 
evidence on the reverse causality from house price movements to sentiment. As 
expected, homebuyers exhibit myopic expectations as evidenced by the positive and 
                                                          
24  The impulse responses plotted using Cholesky factorization are essentially similar to the 
reported graphs. 
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significant coefficients on lagged returns in the BUYER equation, both jointly and 
individually. Homebuyers, presumably the least sophisticated and most 
informationally constrained agents in the market, have to rely on past price 
movements to form their expectations of future house price movements. In contrast, 
builders appear not to be backward looking in forming their expectations. These 
findings are consistent with the prior studies of Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) 
and Ooi and Le (2011) who show that developers lead rather than follow house price 
movements.  
Finally, similar to home buyers, changes in lenders’ underwriting standards 
are associated with past house price changes, but only at the two-quarter lag. Coupled 
with the persistent impact of sentiment on house prices established above, this finding 
of a positive feedback loop from prices to sentiment further indicates the potential for 
housing prices to spiral, which potentially renders housing markets highly prone to 
bubbles. As a final note, all homebuyer, builder and lender sentiment exhibit serial 
correlation as do home prices.   
 
2. VAR estimation results with a composite direct sentiment index 
 The three individual sentiment indices used in this research are highly 
correlated (see Table 3). Thus, it is likely that the three indices have a common 
sentiment element which can be extracted using principal component analysis. This 
study therefore constructs a composite direct sentiment index (DSENT) as the first 
principal component of the three series, similar to Baker and Wurgler (2007) and 
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Ling, Naranjo, and Scheick (2010). The descriptive statistics of DSENT is reported in 
Table 1. 
Generally, DSENT tracks the overall trend of house price changes relatively 
well in Figure 7, and the two time series have a high contemporaneous correlation of 
0.60. Table 6 reports the estimation results of Equation (2) and (3) again using 
DSENT in place of the three individual sentiment indices. The appropriate lag-length 
for the model is again two lags of endogenous variables.  
Figure 7. Composite sentiment index and contemporaneous housing returns 
This figure plots the composite direct sentiment index against contemporaneous housing returns for the 
time period 1990:Q2-2010:Q3. The composite direct sentiment index (DSENT) is the first principal 
component extracted from the buyer sentiment index (BUYER), builder sentiment index (BUILDER) 
and lender sentiment index (LENDER). Housing returns are measured by the quarterly changes in the 




The previous central finding from the individual surveys that sentiment 
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Table 6. VAR estimation results of the composite direct sentiment index 
This table reports the VAR estimation results with the composite direct sentiment index and housing 
returns as endogenous variables:  
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡      
𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡                  
The study period covers 1990Q2-2010Q3. Lag-length is chosen based on three selection criteria AIC, 
HQIC and SBIC. RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real Case-Shiller housing price 
index; DSENT is the first principal component extracted from the buyer sentiment measure (BUYER), 
builder sentiment measure (BUILDER) and lender sentiment measure (LENDER). The RETURN 
equation includes a set of control variables 𝑧𝑡 but their coefficients are not reported for brevity: POP is 
the percentage change in the population aged between 20-30; GDP is real GDP growth (percentage); 
INCOME is real per capita income growth (percentage); UNEMP is the percentage change in 
unemployment rate; MGTRATE is the percentage change in real mortgage rate; SUPPLY is the 
percentage change in the number of residential units completed in each quarter, and is used at the one-
quarter lag to account for simultaneity. ADF tests show that all variables are stationary. *, ** and *** 







Panel A. Coefficient estimation results 
Constant 0.312 -0.157 
 
(0.262) (0.102) 
DSENTt-1 0.323** 0.420*** 
 
(0.163) (0.107) 
DSENTt-2 0.775*** 0.222** 
 
(0.166) (0.111) 
RETURNt-1 0.0337 0.0634 
 
(0.0889) (0.0565) 
RETURNt-2 0.0938 0.107* 
 
(0.0873) (0.0557) 
























Observations 80 80 
R-squared 0.744 0.645 
Panel B. Joint significance tests of estimated coefficients 
DSENTt-2 to t-1 1.098*** 0.642*** 
(F-stat) (51.81) (38.35) 
RETURNt-2 to t-1 0.1275 0.1704** 
(F-stat) (1.58) (7.17) 
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index. Additionally, the impulse response function in Figure 8 confirms that the 
impact of sentiment on house prices is persistent over at least 10 quarters. However, 
there is only weak evidence of a relation between lagged house price changes and 
sentiment, probably due to the mixed results regarding builders versus homebuyers 
and lenders when using the three surveys separately. Specifically, only the two-period 
lag appears weakly significant at 10%, though its joint significance with the one-
quarter lagged return slightly improves to 5%. Finally, while sentiment is still 
positively related to its past values, it seems that the serial correlation of house prices 
disappear when DSENT is controlled for. 
Figure 8. Impulse response function of housing returns to the composite direct 
sentiment index 
This figure plots the impulse response of housing returns to a one standard deviation shock in the 
composite sentiment index DSENT corresponding to the estimated VAR results in Table 6. The red 
lines are the +/- Standard Error responses. RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real 
Case-Shiller housing price index; DSENT is the first principal component extracted from the buyer 
sentiment index (BUYER), builder sentiment index (BUILDER) and lender sentiment index 
(LENDER). 
 
To summarize, the above analysis suggests that the sentiment of important 
agents in housing markets is associated with mispricing in subsequent quarters. 
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Moreover, this mispricing persists over a long period. There is also evidence of 
myopic expectations in the sense that market agents form their beliefs from past price 
movements, with builders being a notable exception. The dynamic interplay between 
sentiment and home prices is therefore a self-reinforcing process, which presents a 
compelling explanation for the high susceptibility of housing markets to bubbles. 
 
3. Sub-period analysis 
To further compare the sentiment’s effect in different market conditions, this 
section re-estimates the VAR models above with two sub-periods corresponding with 
a non-bubble (or normal) and a bubble market. One would intuitively expect 
sentiment to play a more significant role during the formation and bursting of a 
housing bubble than in a more normal period. An important step in this test is 
identifying the start of the recent housing boom. Since there is not yet any clear 
theoretical guide to define the beginning of a boom, this study follows the empirical 
approach in Ferreira & Gyourko (2011). They describe the structural breakpoint, or in 
other words, a significant discrete jump, in the growth rate of house prices as 
signaling an episode of booming. Essentially, the approach involves finding the 
quarter during which there is a global structural break by estimating the following 
equation: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐼(𝑞𝑡 ≥ 𝑞𝑡∗) + 𝜀𝑡       for 1 < 𝑡 < 61                      (4 ) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 is the real price change in quarter t; 𝛼 is the intercept term; 𝛿 
measures the importance of the potential breakpoint; 𝐼(∙) is an indicator function 
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which equals 1 if its condition is true and 0 otherwise; 𝑞𝑡 is quarter t; 𝑞𝑡∗ is the 
location of the potential structural break, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term. Estimated structural 
breakpoint (𝑞�𝑡∗) is the quarter that maximizes the R2 of the equation; that is, the 
quarter in which the change in price growth has the highest power in explaining the 
price growth series itself (Ferreira & Gyourko, 2011). The regression is estimated 
using data only from 1990Q2 (t=1) to 2005Q1 (t=61) to avoid any influence of the 
burst period in locating the structural breakpoint25
 The highest R2 achieved by running Equation (4) is 59.43% at 1998Q1. 
Hence, this result suggests that the boom began in 1998Q1 when the structural break 
occurred. Graphically, it can also be observed from 
.  
Figure 9 that prior to 1998Q1, 
growth rates fluctuated around a value close to 0.5%, but since 1998Q1 they centered 
around about 2.5%. 
 The original study period is then split into two sub-periods based on this 
reference quarter (1990Q2-1997Q4 and 1998Q1-2010Q3) for re-estimating the VAR 
base models. The results are reported in Table 7. Prior to the start of the boom 
(1990Q2-1997Q4), the effect of sentiment on future prices was still present but 
statistically weak (Column 1). Meanwhile, during the formation and bursting of the 
bubble the sentiment coefficients became much stronger in both magnitude and 
significance level as expected. In particular, the change in price growth induced by a 
change in market sentiment during the bubble was 2.5 times larger than that in a 
normal market. These findings suggest that market sentiment had a crucial role to 
                                                          
25 2005Q1 is chosen because it is the quarter with the highest real price changes (RETURN). 
Thereafter, price growth started to slow down. 
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play in the recent housing turmoil. It also provides some direct explanation for the 
observation from Clayton (1996), who finds that his fundamental equation can largely 
explain house price movements but fails to perform in periods of drastic price 
gyrations in the 1980 and 1989 housing bubbles. 
Figure 9. Estimated R2 of Equation (4) and real house changes 1990Q2-2005Q1 
This figure plots the R2 from estimating the following equation:  
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐼(𝑞𝑡 ≥ 𝑞𝑡∗) + 𝜀𝑡         for 1 < 𝑡 < 61           
where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 is the real price changes in quarter t; 𝛼 is the intercept term; 𝛿 measures the 
importance of the potential breakpoint; 𝐼(∙) is an indicator function which equals 1 if its condition is 
true and 0 otherwise; 𝑞𝑡 is quarter t; 𝑞𝑡∗ is the location of the potential structural break, and 𝜀𝑡 is the 
error term. The equation is estimated over 1990Q2-2005Q1. Real house price appreciations 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 , 
measured by the real quarter-on-quarter change (in percentage) in the Case-Shiller index, over the 
same period are also plotted. 
 
 Furthermore, in the second sub-period sentiment seemed to gather momentum 
such that it could be largely predicted by its previous values (Column 4, R2 = 0.696), 
whereas the first sub-period saw much more stochastic sentiment levels that could not 
be explained by either past prices or its past levels (Column 2, R2 = 0.133).  At first 
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Table 7. VAR estimation results for two sub-periods 
This table reports the VAR estimation results with the composite direct sentiment index and housing 
returns as endogenous variables:  
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡      
𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡                  
The models are estimated over two sub-periods, 1990Q2-1997Q4 and 1998Q1-2010Q3. Lag-length is 
chosen based on three selection criteria AIC, HQIC and SBIC. RETURN is the quarterly percentage 
change in the real Case-Shiller housing price index; DSENT is the first principal component extracted 
from the buyer sentiment measure (BUYER), builder sentiment measure (BUILDER) and lender 
sentiment measure (LENDER). The RETURN equation includes a set of control variables 𝑧𝑡 but their 
coefficients are not reported for brevity: POP is the percentage change in the population aged between 
20-30; GDP is real GDP growth (percentage); INCOME is real per capita income growth (percentage); 
UNEMP is the percentage change in unemployment rate; MGTRATE is the percentage change in real 
mortgage rate; SUPPLY is the percentage change in the number of residential units completed in each 
quarter, and is used at the one-quarter lag to account for simultaneity. ADF tests show that all variables 
are stationary. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parentheses, unless otherwise stated. 
  
  
 1990Q2-1997Q4  1998Q1-2010Q3 
 
RETURN DSENT  RETURN DSENT 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A. Coefficient estimation results 
Constant  0.210 -0.155  1.410* -0.164 
  (0.205) (0.118)  (0.802) (0.143) 
DSENTt-1  0.366** 0.0124  0.197 0.519*** 
  (0.172) (0.173)  (0.224) (0.138) 
DSENTt-2  0.0991 0.227  0.977*** 0.159 
  (0.183) (0.172)  (0.224) (0.143) 
RETURNt-1  -0.00384 -0.132  -0.0369 0.0763 
  (0.205) (0.142)  (0.112) (0.0658) 
RETURNt-2  0.386*** 0.228*  0.0577 0.0806 

















































Observations  29 29  51 51 
R-squared  0.561 0.133  0.779 0.696 
Panel B. Joint significance tests of estimated coefficients 
DSENTt-2 to t-1  0.465* 0.239  1.174*** 0.678*** 
(F-stat)  (4.77) (1.75)  (41.42) (31.61) 
RETURNt-2 to t-1  0.382** 0.096  0.021 0.157 
(F-stat)  (8.04) (3.04)  (0.32) (4.12) 
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equation are insignificant even during the bubble (Column 4); or in other words, 
sentiment was not motivated by past house prices. However, running the sub-period 
analysis using the three separate sentiment indices (Appendix A) reveals that in the 
bubble, homebuyers’ and lenders’ sentiment depended largely on past prices whilst 
builders’ did not. This mixed result is likely the reason behind the lack of significance 
for the coefficients of lagged returns in the composite index DSENT equation.  
 In sum, an important inference from these results is that there always exists a 
sentiment-induced mispricing component in house prices regardless of market 
conditions. However, house prices will become much more sensitive to sentiment 
movements in episodes of market bubbles, and sentiment will also appear more 
predictable in such periods. 
 
4. Summary 
 In conclusion, the above evidence consistently demonstrates a persistent effect 
of housing market sentiment on real house prices. All three major participants in the 
housing market – homebuyers, builders and lenders – contribute to drive house prices 
away from fundamentals through their psychological impact. This sentiment-induced 
component becomes much larger during episodes of rapidly rising or falling house 
prices than in moderate periods.  
 The VAR model has also revealed a reverse causality from house prices to 
sentiment in the case of homebuyers and lenders. Builders, however, are not affected 
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by past prices, due possibly to their leading role in the market. Finally, sentiment is 
also sticky as it exhibits strong autocorrelation.   
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Chapter 5 - Robustness Tests  
 
 
1. VAR estimation with Instrument Variable method 
 Since the dependent variable RETURN is measured as the first difference of 
the Case-Shiller price index, if the error term 𝜈1𝑡 in Equation (2) is related to the 
index rather than its change, 𝜈1𝑡 may then be correlated with 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 in Equation 
(2). Hence, this study also employs an instrumental variable (IV) for its estimation. 
Specifically, the IV estimates are calculated in two stages: In the first stage, RETURNt 
is regressed on RETURNt-1 to obtain the predicted values. In the second stage, 
Equation (2) is estimated using the predicted values from the first stage regression 
instead of their actual values. The VAR results using IV for Equation (2) are 
presented in Table 8 . There is virtually no change compared with previous results: 
the coefficients in SENTIMENT equations remain the same, whilst the coefficients in 
RETURN equations only slightly change in their magnitude. 
 
2. VAR estimation with a composite indirect sentiment index 
 The second robustness check is concerned with the measure of sentiment. In 
addition to the direct survey-based measures of sentiment used above, many indirect 
proxies have been widely used in the behavioural finance literature. Baker and  
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Table 8. VAR estimation results (by IV method) of three sentiment indices  
This table reports the VAR estimation results using instrumental variable with sentiment and housing 
returns as endogenous variables:  
 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡       
 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡           
The study period covers 1990Q2-2010Q3. Lag-length is chosen based on three selection criteria AIC, 
HQIC and SBIC. RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real Case-Shiller housing price 
index; BUYER is the homebuyer sentiment index; BUILDER is the builder sentiment index; LENDER 
is the lender sentiment index. All RETURN equations include a set of control variables 𝑧𝑡 but their 
coefficients are not reported for brevity: POP is the percentage change in the population aged between 
20-30; GDP is real GDP growth (percentage); INCOME is real per capita income growth (percentage); 
UNEMP is the percentage change in unemployment rate; MGTRATE is the percentage change in real 
mortgage rate; SUPPLY is the percentage change in the number of residential units completed in each 
quarter, and is used at the one-quarter lag to account for simultaneity. ADF tests show that all variables 
are stationary. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parentheses, unless otherwise stated. 
 
 
Homebuyers’ sentiment  Builders’ sentiment  Lenders’ sentiment 
 
RETURN BUYER  RETURN BUILDER  RETURN LENDER 
Panel A. Coefficient estimation results 
Constant -0.462 -0.376  0.102 -0.676  0.130 -1.200 
 (0.337) (0.234)  (0.356) (0.944)  (0.344) (1.208) 
SENTIMENTt-1 0.0781 0.374***  0.00997 0.545***  0.0205 0.565*** 
 (0.0866) (0.109)  (0.0212) (0.108)  (0.0171) (0.110) 
SENTIMENTt-2 0.199** 0.0573  0.0607*** 0.338***  0.0570*** 0.0206 
 (0.0830) (0.105)  (0.0211) (0.114)  (0.0176) (0.118) 
RETURNt-1 0.481*** 0.312**  0.233 -0.0188  0.242 -0.167 
 (0.170) (0.124)  (0.173) (0.516)  (0.163) (0.675) 
RETURNt-2 0.449** 0.0171  0.327* 0.478  0.360** 1.890*** 







































































 Observations 79 79  79 79  79 79 
R-squared 0.647 0.340  0.682 0.722  0.699 0.578 
Panel B. Joint significance tests of estimated coefficients 
SENTIMENTt-2 to t-1 0.277*** 0.431***  0.0707*** 0.883***  0.078*** 0.586*** 
(F-stat) (5.19) (18.39)  (9.49) (109.11)  (11.86) (36.91) 
RETURNt-2 to t-1 0.93*** 0.3291***  0.56** 0.4592  0.602** 1.723*** 
(F-stat) (13.27) (10.44)  (3.47) (1.01)  (4.90) (9.56) 
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Wurgler (2007) provide a comprehensive discussion of the various common proxies 
for investor sentiment in the stock market, from which this thesis derives many 
equivalent measures for the housing markets. This thesis constructs an indirect 
sentiment index (INSENT) from three proxies – namely home sale transaction 
volumes, residential mortgage flows, and housing starts. Data on the quarterly new 
and used home sales are obtained from the Bureau of Census and National 
Association of Realtors, residential mortgage flows from the Federal Reserve Flow of 
Funds Accounts, and housing starts from the Bureau of Census. Even though they do 
not perfectly represent sentiment, each of the above three series likely contains an 
element of sentiment. Arguably, the market will observe higher transaction 
volumes26, mortgage flows27, and housing starts28
Table 1
 during periods of investor 
overconfidence. Similar to the survey-based data series, the three indirect sentiment 
proxies are first regressed against a set of macroeconomic factors to remove their 
influences; the residuals are then used in the principal component analysis to obtain 
INSENT (See  for descriptive statistics). Estimating the base VAR model 
specified in Equation (2) and (3) with this indirect sentiment index gives a somewhat  
                                                          
26  Baker and Stein (2004) posit that market liquidity can serve as a sentiment proxy. In the 
presence of short-sale constraints, irrational investors are more inclined to trade when they are 
optimistic, hence adding liquidity, than when they are pessimistic. Likewise, housing speculators are 
more likely to enter the market when their expectations for future price increases are high, coupled 
with homebuyers worrying about being priced out of the market.  
 
27  Clayton, Ling and Naranjo (2009) argue that commercial mortgage flows are widely viewed 
as a barometer of investment sentiment, in part because of the association between past real estate 
cycles and excessive mortgage flows during periods of low perceived risks. An equivalent measure for 
the housing market is residential mortgage flows. 
 
28  Housing starts are in many ways similar to IPOs and secondary equity offering events in the 
stock market.  In finance, it is well established that the market timing of IPOs and secondary equity 
offerings is influenced by positive sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2000). In the same way, housing 
developers typically attempt to time their projects to take advantage of the rising prices during periods 
of optimism. 
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Table 9. VAR estimation results of the composite indirect sentiment index 
This table reports the VAR estimation results with the composite indirect sentiment index and housing 
returns as endogenous variables:  
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡          
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡                     
The study period covers 1990Q2-2010Q3. Lag-length is chosen based on three selection criteria AIC, 
HQIC and SBIC. RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real Case-Shiller housing price 
index; INSENT is the first principal component extracted from housing transaction volume, residential 
mortgage flows and housing starts. The RETURN equation includes a set of control variables 𝑧𝑡 but 
their coefficients are not reported for brevity: POP is the percentage change in the population aged 
between 20-30; GDP is real GDP growth (percentage); INCOME is real per capita income growth 
(percentage); UNEMP is the percentage change in unemployment rate; MGTRATE is the percentage 
change in real mortgage rate; SUPPLY is the percentage change in the number of residential units 
completed in each quarter, and is used at the one-quarter lag to account for simultaneity. ADF tests 
show that all variables are stationary. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, 









Panel A. Coefficient estimation results 
Constant -0.169 -0.141 
 (0.321) (0.0964) 
INSENTt-1 -0.0172 0.670*** 
 (0.216) (0.114) 
INSENTt-2 0.528** 0.217 
 (0.254) (0.138) 
INSENTt-3 -0.306 0.0458 
 (0.283) (0.147) 
INSENTt-4 -0.347 -0.149 
 (0.249) (0.120) 
RETURNt-1 0.153 0.0522 
 (0.101) (0.0552) 
RETURNt-2 0.276*** 0.0755 
 (0.106) (0.0582) 
RETURNt-3 0.181 -0.0408 
 (0.116) (0.0600) 
RETURNt-4 0.159 0.0678 
 (0.114) (0.0603) 
Control  zt Yes No 
Observations 78 78 
R-squared 0.668 0.777 
Panel B. Joint significance tests of estimated coefficients 
INSENTt-4 to t-1 -0.142 0.784*** 
 
(F-stat) (7.32) (121.00) 
RETURNt-4 to t-1 0.769*** 0.155* 
 (F-stat) (34.78) 
(9.29) 
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similar but weaker result (Table 9). Though the indirect sentiment indicator is still 
found to Granger-cause subsequent price appreciations as in the central hypothesis, 
only its two-period lagged coefficient appears statistically significant, while there is 
no evidence for the reverse causal relation. An implication from this exercise is that 
sentiment measured by direct surveys is more useful in predicting house prices than 
indirect proxies extracted from market indicators. 
 
3. VAR forecast accuracy 
 This study also computes out-of-sample forecast of house prices to evaluate 
the model with DSENT (Equation 2) versus a conventional model which comprises all 
the exogenous variables with the exception of the sentiment proxy (Equation 5):  
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡        (2) 
             𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝛾𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡                                                    (5) 
 The forecast process involves randomly selecting a window between 1990Q1-
2010Q1 for estimating Equation (2) and Equation (5); the estimated coefficients are 
then used to forecast house prices in 1-year, 3-year and 5-year ahead. This process is 
repeated 100 times. Three common measures to evaluate forecast accuracy are 
adopted, namely mean error (ME), mean percentage error (MPE) and mean squared 
error (MSE). The results are presented in Table 10. Overall, the VAR model with the 
sentiment index provides more accurate forecasts of house prices over the short and 
medium term (1-year and 3-year), i.e. it has lower forecast errors, than the 
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conventional regression model. This confirms that sentiment is an important 
determinant of house prices in the short and medium term. However, over a 5-year 
horizon the fundamental model seems to perform better in predicting housing prices, 
consistent with the common notion that house prices and fundamentals are 
cointergrated in the long run.  
Table 10. Measures of forecast accuracy 
This table reports the various measures of forecast accuracy of two models of house prices: 
         With sentiment:  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡         
         Without sentiment:  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝛾𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡                                             
The following forecast measures are employed: Mean Error =  ME =  1
n
∑ (forecastt − actualt)nt=1   Mean Percentage Error =  MPE =  1
n
∑ (forecastt − actualt)/actualtnt=1 ∗ 100  Mean Squared Error =  MSE =  1
n
∑ (forecastt − actualt)2nt=1   
 
  
With sentiment  Without sentiment 
1-year 3-year 5-year  1-year 3-year 5-year 
Mean Error -0.077 0.376 16.797  0.429 0.404 0.420 
Mean Percentage Error 24.0% 30.0% 185.5%  47.7% 53.0% 66.2% 
Mean Squared Error 0.01 0.14 282.13  7.91 12.79 16.74 
 
4. Long-run regressions 
 The discussion to this point has focused mainly on the short-run relationship 
between house prices and market sentiment through a VAR framework. Arguably, if 
periods of optimism (pessimism) lead to house prices overshooting (undershooting) in 
the initial periods, the market should observe a negative relationship between 
cumulative long-run returns and sentiment as prices revert to their fundamental values 
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over time. Such a finding will also be in line with the forecasting results in the above 
section.  
 In this section, the long-run effect of sentiment is tested using a framework 
adopted from Brown & Cliff (2005) and Ling, Naranjo & Scheick (2010). It involves 
regressing future k-period quarterly housing returns on a vector of control variables 
𝑧𝑡 and the composite sentiment index 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡:  
(𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 + ⋯+𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+𝑘)/𝑘 = 𝛼(𝑘) + 𝜃(𝑘)𝑧𝑡 + 𝛽(𝑘)𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   (6) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+1, … ,𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+𝑘 are quarterly real price changes as before, k is 
the number of quarters in the holding period, 𝛼(𝑘) is the intercept term, 𝑧𝑡 is the same 
set of control variables employed in the previous VAR models, and 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the 
composite index derived from the homebuyers’, builders’ and lenders’ sentiment 
measures. The test is carried out over one- to five-year horizons (k = 4 to 20). If 
sentiment’s effect is persistent, as one would expect in the housing markets, this will 
result in a positive coefficient on 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 over a short and medium horizon that is 
similar to the results from the VAR models. However, in a well-function market 
prices should eventually revert to their fundamental values, such that a negative 
coefficient on 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 in the long run will be observed. 
 There are two econometric issues in estimating the long-run model specified 
above. Firstly, the use of overlapping observations in the dependent variable results in 
a moving average process in the error term, causing the standard errors obtained from 
an OLS estimation to be biased downwards. As pointed out by Ling, Naranjo & 
Scheick (2010), the second issue is the potential finite sample bias in the coefficient 
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estimate of a persistent independent variable (in this case, the coefficient 𝛽(𝑘) 
associated with the sentiment index 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡). Stambaugh (1999) shows that a 
persistent explanatory variable, though predetermined, is not strictly exogenous. 
Although an OLS estimate is consistent and asymtotically normally distributed under 
the predetermined assumption, it might suffer from biasness with a finite sample 
setting. To address these econometric issues, this thesis employs a bootstrap 
simulation procedure similar to Brown & Cliff (2005) and Ling, Naranjo & Scheick 
(2010). The details of the bootstrap procedure are explained in Appendix B. 
 Table 11 reports the bias-adjusted coefficients of the sentiment measure 
𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 and their standard errors for five different return horizons. The results are 
revealing. The sentiment coefficients on the one-, two- and three-year average returns 
are significantly positive, indicating a continuation of price divergence from 
fundamental values for as long as three years. However, their magnitudes are 
decreasing as the return horizon increases, which points towards a gradual price 
correction process at work. 
 The effect of sentiment then falls sharply in both economic and statistical 
significance in the four-year return regression, and becomes negative over the five-
year horizon, albeit statistically weak. This inevitably suggests that market sentiment 
at a given time induces very persistent mispricing in future house prices that takes 
beyond five years to correct. It is consistent with the proposition in the previous 
sections that housing markets are highly susceptible to prolonged periods of 
sentiment-induced mispricing. The five-year adjustment period is a marked contrast 
  
Chapter 5: Robustness Tests 
67 
Table 11. Long-run regression results 
This table reports the results from estimating the following long-run regression model: (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 + ⋯+𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡+𝑘)/𝑘 = 𝛼(𝑘) + 𝜃(𝑘)𝑧𝑡 + 𝛽(𝑘)𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real Case-Shiller housing price index and k is the 
number of quarters in the holding period. DSENT is the first principal component extracted from the 
buyer sentiment measure (BUYER), builder sentiment measure (BUILDER) and lender sentiment 
measure (LENDER). The set of control variables 𝑧𝑡 includes: POP is the percentage change in the 
population aged between 20-30; GDP is real GDP growth (percentage); INCOME is real per capita 
income growth (percentage); UNEMP is the percentage change in unemployment rate; MGTRATE is 
the percentage change in real mortgage rate; SUPPLY is the percentage change in the number of 
residential units completed in each quarter. The reported coefficients are bias-adjusted OLS estimates 
derived from the bootstrap simulation procedure documented in the Appendix.  *, ** and *** denote 
10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
 




One-year 4 1.575*** 0.14 0.709 
Two-year 8 1.100*** 0.12 0.475 
Three-year 12 0.888*** 0.11 0.301 
Four-year 16 0.174* 0.09 0.167 
Five-year 20 -0.059 0.10 0.104 
 
 
to the quick correction of stock prices in studies such as Schmeling (2009), Barber, 
Odean & Zhu (2009), and Brown & Cliff (2005), to name but a few, who find that 
stock prices revert in only one to twelve months. It is, on the other hand, close to the 
results from prior studies in the housing literature looking into the price adjustment to 
supply and demand shocks. For example, Harter-Dreiman (2004) finds that it takes 
about five years for housing prices to get within 70% of its new equilibrium value in 
response to an income shock, whilst the adjustment speed in Malpezzi (1999) is 
approximately 10 years. Nevertheless, a potential limitation of this finding is that the 
study period (1990Q2-2010Q3) covers mostly the recent housing bubble. Thus, it 
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cannot be ruled out that such a slow correction found in the long-run regression might 
be driven partly by the fact that house prices were consistently rising for a long period 
of time as the bubble built. 
 
5. The relationship between sentiment, house prices and trading volume 
 Finally, this section expands the basic model to a three-equation VAR system 
to incorporate trading volume as an additional endogenous variable: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑1𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑡−𝑖 +    + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡                                                       (7) 
𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑2𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡   
                                                                                                                           (8) 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼3 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾3𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑3𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑡−𝑖 +    +𝜈3𝑡                                                                (9) 
 Along with house prices, trading volume is widely recognized as an essential 
barometer of the housing markets. The positive correlation between house prices and 
trading volume has been a familiar question for ongoing research29
                                                          
29  Stein (1995) posits that during periods when property prices are falling, existing homeowners will 
find it difficult to purchase a new home due to down-payment constraints. This results in fewer 
transactions in the market. Genesove and Mayer (2001), on the other hand, argue that sellers who are 
loss averse tend to raise their reservation prices. This results in higher time-on-market and lower sale 
hazard. 
. This section tests 
a simple proposition that such a positive co-movement is the outcome of both trading 
activities and house prices being induced by market sentiment. Trading volume is 
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measured as the total number of new and existing single-family home sales, which are 
obtained from the National Association of Realtors and U.S. Bureau of Census. 
 Table 12 reports the estimation results of the VAR model with housing returns 
(RETURN), the direct composite sentiment index (DSENT) and change in trading 
volume (VOLUME). The model uses four lags of each endogenous variable as 
indicated by standard selection criteria. Similar to the previous results, market 
sentiment (DSENT) again appears strongly significant in the RETURN equation. As 
expected, trading volume is also driven by sentiment, evidenced by the positive 
coefficients of DSENT in the third column of Table 12. Although only the first lag of 
DSENT appears significant, the joint test of all four lags indicates strong significance 
at 1% level. The evidence thus supports the hypothesis that both trading volume and 
prices are influenced by sentiment.  
Table 12. VAR estimation results with trading volume 
This table reports the VAR estimation results with the composite direct sentiment index, housing 
returns and trading volumes as endogenous variables: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑1𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡         
𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑2𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡             
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼3 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾3𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑3𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈3𝑡         
The study period covers 1990Q2-2010Q3. Lag-length is chosen based on three selection criteria AIC, 
HQIC and SBIC. RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real Case-Shiller housing price 
index; DSENT is the first principal component extracted from the buyer sentiment measure (BUYER), 
builder sentiment measure (BUILDER) and lender sentiment measure (LENDER); VOLUME is the 
quarterly percentage change in the number of home sales. The RETURN equation includes a set of 
control variables 𝑧𝑡 but their coefficients are not reported for brevity. ADF tests show that all variables 
are stationary. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. Standard errors 
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RETURN DSENT VOLUME 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Coefficient estimation results   
Constant 0.441 -0.295*** 0.0156** 
 (0.269) (0.109) (0.00682) 
DSENTt-1 0.307* 0.426*** 0.0138** 
 (0.169) (0.110) (0.00688) 
DSENTt-2 0.614*** 0.415*** 0.0110 
 (0.185) (0.117) (0.00735) 
DSENTt-3 0.202 -0.311*** 0.00772 
 (0.183) (0.118) (0.00742) 
DSENTt-4 -0.114 -0.315*** 0.000614 
 (0.184) (0.121) (0.00761) 
RETURNt-1 -0.145 0.158** -0.00392 
 (0.0941) (0.0637) (0.00400) 
RETURNt-2 -0.0481 0.243*** -0.00631 
 (0.0985) (0.0622) (0.00391) 
RETURNt-3 0.0833 -0.00510 -0.00767* 
 (0.0951) (0.0630) (0.00395) 
RETURNt-4 0.219** 0.0223 0.000730 
 (0.0912) (0.0596) (0.00374) 
VOLUMEt-1 7.620** -0.422 -0.124 
 (3.530) (2.205) (0.138) 
VOLUMEt-2 11.23*** 0.615 0.161 
 (3.272) (2.111) (0.133) 
VOLUMEt-3 7.972** -0.835 0.268** 
 (3.304) (2.123) (0.133) 
VOLUMEt-4 -0.632 -2.936 -0.176 
 (3.549) (2.369) (0.149) 
Control  zt Yes No No 
Observations 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.799 0.727 0.271 
Panel B. Joint significance tests of estimated coefficients   
DSENTt-4 to t-1 1.009*** 0.215*** 0.033*** 
(F-stat) (37.42) (64.64) (18.07) 
RETURNt-4 to t-1 0.109* 0.418*** -0.107 
(F-stat) (8.89) (23.33) (7.35) 
VOLUMEt-4 to t-1 26.19*** -3.578 0.129** 
(F-stat) (16.26) (2.42) (10.31) 
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  Meanwhile, when sentiment is controlled for, there is somewhat weak 
evidence of trading volume being influenced adversely by past house prices. The 
negative coefficients of RETURN, although marginally significant, indicate that 
higher prices discourage aspiring buyers from entering the market. The reverse 
causality is stronger in the direction of past trading volume influencing current 
housing returns, consistent with the notion that higher trading volume signals 
increasing demand that pushes up prices and vice versa. Trading volume is also fairly 
predictable from its past values. Interestingly, sentiment is not driven by trading 
volume but by house price changes only. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
 
1. Summary of findings  
 The source of house price volatility is of great interest to policy makers 
because housing plays a crucial part in the economy. Yet, the inherent characteristics 
of housing markets often render home prices susceptible to sentiment-induced 
mispricing. Despite the potential relevance of psychological factors in explaining 
price movements in the housing market, no research has directly tested the 
relationship between sentiment and house prices due to the difficulty in measuring 
sentiment. This thesis seeks to provide new evidence on the role of psychology in 
driving house prices through various direct proxies to quantify sentiment. These 
measures are derived from surveys on the perceptions of homebuyers, builders and 
lenders about housing markets that are conducted on a frequent basis by various 
institutions in the U.S. The two primary research questions guiding the empirical tests 
are: (1) Does sentiment have a role in explaining house price movements, above and 
beyond the role of fundamentals and, (2) Do past price movements predict changes in 
sentiment beyond the predictions of lagged sentiment and fundamentals?  
 The estimation results from VAR models provide affirmative results for both 
research questions. The central finding from this thesis is that sentiment, regardless of 
homebuyers, builders or lenders, indeed has a significant impact on house prices. In 
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particular, overoptimism appears to drive prices above fundamental values and vice 
versa. Moreover, this effect is highly persistent in that a sentiment shock will be 
channelled into housing returns over at least five years. This sentiment-induced 
component becomes much larger during episodes of fast escalating and slumping 
house prices than in moderate periods. When forecasting future house prices in the 
short and medium terms, forecast errors can be substantially reduced by adding 
sentiment indices into the conventional (fundamental) equation. In the long run, 
however, sentiment is found to be negatively related to the future five-year average 
house prices as the correction process starts to take place. Hence, over a five-year 
horizon a fundamental price model with only supply and demand factors can better 
predict house prices. 
 The results also provide some evidence of a feedback relationship between 
house prices and sentiment. Homebuyers and lenders are affected by past prices in 
forming their beliefs, whilst builders do not seem to be backward looking. Coupled 
with the persistent impact of sentiment on house prices established above, this finding 
of a positive feedback loop from prices to household and lender sentiment further 
supports the potential for housing prices to spiral, which potentially renders housing 
markets highly prone to bubbles. 
 In addition, adding trading volume as another endogenous variable into the 
VAR system reveals that both trading volume and prices are influenced by sentiment. 
When sentiment is controlled for, there is somewhat weak evidence of trading volume 
being influenced adversely by past house prices, while past trading volume strongly 
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influence current housing returns in a positive manner. This is consistent with the 
notion that higher prices discourage buying activities whereas higher trading volume 
signals increasing demand that pushes up prices. Finally, sentiment is not found to be 
affected by trading volume. 
 
2. Implications and limitations 
Discovering the link between house prices and sentiment has many important 
implications for the general understanding of the housing markets. Firstly, mispricing 
is an inherent component of house prices at least in the short run. Secondly, house 
price volatility can be better predicted when taking into account the sentiment of 
market participants. Lastly, in a recent working paper that focuses on the latest 
housing bubble, Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2010) highlight a pressing call for 
future research on the interplay between bubbles, beliefs and credit condition. This 
study’s finding of a “spiral” sentiment effect thus provides some first insights to the 
question raised on the part of misbeliefs and bubbles. For a more complete answer to 
the issue, further research is needed on the long-run effect of sentiment, the price 
correction process and the interaction between sentiment and other fundamental price 
determinants. 
As a final note, this research is carried out at the aggregate level due to the 
fact that the sentiment proxies are derived from survey data which are only available 
at the national level. Much as the study has revealed many important discoveries into 
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the aggregate price dynamics, it is important to recognize that there exists much 
heterogeneity in both market sentiment and house prices among local regions. Thus, 
where available data permit, similar study carried out on local markets will greatly 
improve the current understanding of this relatively unexplored area. 
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Appendix A 
 VAR estimation results of individual sentiment indices, 1998Q1-2010Q3 
 
This table reports the VAR estimation results with three sentiment indices and housing returns as 
endogenous variables:  
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜈1𝑡    
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖=1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑡                 
The models are estimated over the bubble period 1998Q1-2010Q3. Lag-length is chosen based on 
three selection criteria AIC, HQIC and SBIC. RETURN is the quarterly percentage change in the real 
Case-Shiller housing price index; BUYER is the homebuyer sentiment index; BUILDER is the builder 
sentiment index; LENDER is the lender sentiment index. All RETURN equations include a set of 
control variables 𝑧𝑡 but their coefficients are not reported for brevity: POP is the percentage change in 
the population aged between 20-30; GDP is real GDP growth (percentage); INCOME is real per capita 
income growth (percentage); UNEMP is the percentage change in unemployment rate; MGTRATE is 
the percentage change in real mortgage rate; SUPPLY is the percentage change in the number of 
residential units completed in each quarter, and is used at the one-quarter lag to account for 
simultaneity. ADF tests show that all variables are stationary. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% 
significant levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses, unless otherwise stated. 
 
 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.731 -0.489*  1.018 -0.964  1.465* -1.099 
 (0.893) (0.280)  (0.851) (1.295)  (0.859) (1.703) 
SENTIMENTt-1 0.0618 0.500***  0.00423 0.548***  0.0197 0.623*** 
 (0.126) (0.139)  (0.0254) (0.133)  (0.0202) (0.138) 
SENTIMENTt-2 0.335*** -0.0582  0.0818*** 0.375***  0.0685*** -0.000424 
 (0.123) (0.132)  (0.0254) (0.140)  (0.0220) (0.148) 
RETURNt-1 0.170 0.364***  0.0470 0.0647  0.0267 -0.129 
 (0.124) (0.122)  (0.122) (0.594)  (0.126) (0.798) 
RETURNt-2 0.262** -0.0403  0.113 0.307  0.149 1.722** 
 (0.129) (0.131)  (0.122) (0.599)  (0.115) (0.756) 
Control zt Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Observations 52 52  52 52  52 52 





Bootstrap simulation procedure 
 
This thesis adopts the bootstrap simulation procedure described in Brown & 
Cliff (2005) and Ling, Naranjo & Scheick (2010). First, the long-run regressions 
specified in Equation (5) are estimated using OLS and the beta coefficients of the 
sentiment measure, ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆, are saved to calculate bias-adjusted coefficients later. 
The second step involves generating a pseudo return series under the null 
hypothesis that sentiment has no effect on house prices. The following vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model is used as the underlying data generating process of the 
pseudo return series: 
VAR(1) for yt = [𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡, 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡]              (1) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 is the real price changes, 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 is our measure of sentiment, and 
𝑧𝑡 is the set of control variables. The beta coefficient on 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 is set to zero to 
ensure that the pseudo return series is generated under the null. The predicted y-
values and residuals from the VAR estimations are saved. 
In the third step, each residual is first multiplied by {n/(n-v)}1/2 to adjust for a 
downward bias that results from the use of OLS in estimating the VAR model, where 
n is the number of observations and v refers to the degrees of freedom of the VAR 
(MacKinnon, 2002). The next step involves sampling with replacement from these 
residuals to generate a new set of bootstrapped residuals. This sampling process is 
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repeated 10,100 times but the first 100 samples are discarded to avoid any startup 
effects.  
Fourth, the remaining 10,000 sets of bootstrapped residuals are added to the 
predicted y-value saved from the VAR estimation above to create 10,000 sets of 
pseudo return series. From these pseudo return series, 10,000 new sets of k-period 
future returns can be created as the dependent variables in the long-horizon model 
specified in Equation (5). OLS is used to estimate the regressions with these new 
dependent variables, yielding 10,000 beta coefficients for each of the return horizons.  
The bootstrap simulation procedure discussed above can be utilized to correct 
for the bias in coefficient estimates within finite sample settings when the bias 
function is not known analytically (see MacKinnon and Smith, 1998). Assuming the 
bias is constant for a particular return horizon, the estimated bias is expressed as:  
Calculating bias-adjusted beta: 
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 =  ?̅? − ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 (2) 
where ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 is the OLS beta coefficient from running the original long-run regression 
(Step 1 above), and ?̅? is the sample mean of the 10,000 simulated beta coefficients. 
The adjusted beta coefficient can therefore be specified as: 
?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗 = ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 −  �?̅? − ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆� = 2?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 − ?̅?       (3) 
This bias-adjusted estimator has been widely shown to provide reliable coefficient 
estimates in the bootstrap literature. 
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 Since asymptotic standard errors calculated from a small sample with 
overlapping observations suffer from significant downward bias, the bootstrap 
standard error can be used as a more accurate alternative. It is simply the standard 
deviation of the 10,000 simulated beta coefficients: 
Calculating adjusted t-statistics and p-values: 
𝑠𝑒�?̂?� = � 1
𝐵−1




2�     (4) 
where ?̂?𝑖 is the estimated beta coefficient from iteration i of the simulation process, ?̅? 
is the sample mean of the 10,000 simulated coefficients, and B is the number of 
simulations. The new bias-adjusted t-statistic can be calculated as follows: 
?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 𝛽�𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑠𝑒�𝛽��             (5) 
 Because the t-statistics constructed in this manner do not always follow the 
standard t-distribution, this thesis develops a bootstrap distribution of t-statistics to 
compute more accurate p-values for testing of the null hypothesis. The bootstrap t-
distribution is derived from 10,000 adjusted t-statistics of the simulation process: 
?̂?𝑖
∗ = 𝛽�𝑖−𝛽�
𝑠𝑒(𝛽�)  (6) 
where ?̂?𝑖 is the estimated beta coefficient from iteration i of the simulation process, ?̅? 
is the sample mean of the 10,000 simulated betas, and 𝑠𝑒(?̂?) is the bootstrap standard 
error. This technique generates an empirical distribution of the t-statistics that 
provides new critical values for hypothesis testing. 
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 Finally, there are two approaches for computing p-values. The first approach 
assumes the distribution is symmetric around zero; thus, p-values can be calculated 
as: 
?̂?𝑠 = 1𝐵 ∑ 𝐼�|?̂?𝑖∗| > �?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗��𝐵𝑖=1        (7) 
where 𝐼(∙) denotes the indicator function, which equals 1 if its argument is true and 0 
otherwise,  |?̂?𝑖∗| is the absolute value of the t-statistic of iteration i as in (6), �?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗� is 
the absolute value of the bias-adjusted t-statistic specified in (5), and B is the number 
of simulations.  
 On the other hand, the second approach assumes an asymmetric distribution: 
?̂?𝑛𝑠 = 2 𝑚𝑖𝑛 �1𝐵 ∑ 𝐼�?̂?𝑖∗ > ?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗�𝐵𝑖=1 , 1𝐵 ∑ 𝐼�?̂?𝑖∗ < ?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗�𝐵𝑖=1 �                  (8) 
 This thesis employs both approaches in calculating the p-values for the bias-
adjusted sentiment coefficients and the results are similar (except in the four-year 
horizon regression, where (7) indicates a significant sentiment coefficient at 10% 
level whilst (8) gives an insignificant beta). Hence, only the results from the first 
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